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Tiivistelmä: Entinen luovuttamisjärjestelmä EU:n jäsenmaiden korvattiin eurooppalaisella 
pidätysmääräyksellä vuoden 2002 puitepäätöksellä. Eurooppalaisen pidätysmääräyksen ja 
oikeuden oikeudenmukaiseen oikeudenkäyntiin väliltä löytyy useita ongelmakohtia. 
Vuoden 2002 puitemääräys ei nimenomaisesti salli jäsenvaltion kieltäytyvän henkilön 
luovuttamisesta sillä perusteella, että hänen oikeutensa oikeudenmukaiseen 
oikeudenkäyntiin olisi kohdemaassa vaarassa. Euroopan unionin tuomioistuin on kuitenkin 
oikeuskäytännössään päätynyt siihen, että luovuttamisesta voidaan näissä tilanteissa 
kieltäytyä. Kieltäytymiselle on kuitenkin asetettu tiukat edellytykset. 
EU:n tuomioistuin on ottanut vaikutteita jäsenvaltioiden yhteisistä perustuslaillisissa 
traditioita määrittääkseen perusoikeuksia käytännössä. Jokainen jäsenvaltio on myös 
Euroopan ihmisoikeussopimuksen jäsen ja siten sen sääntöjen sitoma. 
Jäsenvaltioiden välinen keskinäinen luottamus vaatii (poikkeukselliset tilanteet pois lukien), 
että jäsenvaltiot olettavat toistensa noudattavan EU:n sääntelyä, mutta erityisesti 
perusoikeuksia, jotka EU-oikeus tunnustaa. Tämän hetkinen epäselvyys itse puitepäätöksen ja 
oikeuskäytännön sisällön välillä korjattaisiin ideaalitilanteessa täydentämällä puitepäätöstä 
oikeuskäytännön nykytilan mukaiseksi, mikä korostaisi oikeusvarmuutta. 
 
Avainsanat: Euroopan unionin oikeus, ihmisoikeudet, oikeudenkäynti, rikoksentekijän 
luovutus, oikeusvaltio, Euroopan ihmisoikeussopimus 
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SUMMARY 
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Summary: The formal extradition procedure was abolished among the European Union’s 
Member States and replaced with the surrender-based European Arrest Warrant adopted 
under the Framework Decision of 18 June 2002.  Several persistent issues concerning the EAW 
and the right to a fair trial exist. 
The Framework Decision does not expressly provide grounds for mandatory or even optional 
non-execution of a requested person if that surrender would infringe a person’s fundamental 
right to a fair trial. CJEU in its case law established that right to a fair trial can, under strict 
conditions, lead to a non-execution of a EAW. 
The CJEU has drawn inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States for the purposes of defining fundamental rights. Each of the Member States is also a 
signatory to the ECHR and is therefore bound to apply its rules.  
The principle of mutual trust requires, save in exceptional circumstances, to consider all the 
other Member States to be complying with EU law and particularly with the fundamental 
rights recognised by EU law. The currently unclear situation concerning EAW’s non-execution 
would ideally be achieved by inserting express provisions in the Framework Decision, which 
would promote certainty of law. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Let There Be Mutual Recognition 
“The European Council underlines the importance of effective judicial cooperation in the 
fight against cross-border crime. It recognises the need to enhance the ability of national 
legal systems to work closely together and asks the Council to identify the scope for greater 
mutual recognition of decisions of each other’s courts.”1 
The paragraph above is one of the conclusions of the meeting of the European Council in 
Cardiff in 1998, the genesis of the mutual recognition programme in criminal matters. 
The central aim is the recognition and execution of judicial decisions from one Member State 
to another with minimal barriers: judicial co-operation is thus achieved without harmonizing 
national regulation. Member State A simply recognizes Member State B’s judicial decision as 
equivalent to A’s own decision (even with no directly comparable national solution).2 
The following year at the meeting of the European Council held in Tampere, the European 
Council stressed that enhanced mutual recognition of judicial decisions and judgments and 
the necessary approximation of legislation would facilitate cooperation between authorities 
and the judicial protection of individual rights and therefore the European Council endorsed 
the principle of mutual recognition, which in its view “should become the cornerstone of 
judicial cooperation in both civil and criminal matters within the Union.”3 The origin of what 
would become the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) can be traced to the following statement: 
“[The European Council] considers that the formal extradition procedure should be 
abolished among the Member States as far as persons are concerned who are fleeing from 
justice after having been finally sentenced, and replaced by a simple transfer of such 
persons, in compliance with Article 6 TEU. Consideration should also be given to fast track 
extradition procedures, without prejudice to the principle of fair trial.”4 
Although the idea of an European arrest warrant was originally met with scepticism, as it 
brought into discussion the prejudice of the Member states’ sovereignty, the terrorist attacks 
of 11 September 2001 in the United States of America happened to convince the European 
Union’s (EU) Member States of the necessity of adopting a legal instrument contributing to 
the maintenance and the development of a common space of freedom, security and justice.5 
Only some days after 9/11, the European Council included the proposal for a European arrest 
                                                          
1 The Cardiff European Council. Presidency Conclusions, SN 150/1/98 REV 1. 15 and 16 June 1998, para. 39. 
2 As Marguery has noted, mutual recognition establishes a link between the external limits (fundamental rights) 
and the internal limits to punishment (the functions of punishment). Marguery (2018), p. 715. 
3 The Tampere European Council. Presidency Conclusions, 200/1/99. 16 October 1999, para. 33. 
4 The Tampere European Council. Presidency Conclusions, 200/1/99. 16 October 1999, para. 35. 
5 Pirlac (2011), p. 353. 
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warrant in a European action plan to combat terrorism.6 EAW soon became reality when the 
Council of the European Union (the Council) adopted the Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA 
of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender Procedures between the 
EU Member States (‘the Framework Decision’). The Framework Decision entered into force on 
7 August 2002 with a deadline of 31 December 2003 for final implementation by Member 
States. 
Article 1(1) of the Framework Decision defines EAW as “a judicial decision issued by a Member 
State with a view to the arrest and surrender by another Member State of a requested person, 
for the purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution or executing a custodial sentence or 
detention order.” An important element of the EAW as a whole comprises of surrender, which 
can be defined as the official proceedings whereby one State surrenders a suspected or 
convicted criminal to another State. 
Before the Framework Decision, extradition was regulated by multiple treaties between 
Member States.7 In fact, extradition represents one of the oldest forms of cooperation 
between states in order to combat criminality, which originally appeared as a consequence of 
absolute monarchies’ need to preserve their authority.8 The EAW thus provided a more 
uniform regulation and streamlined process for Member States than separate treaties. 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is, however, increasingly faced with 
balancing fundamental rights with the principle of mutual trust and recognition in the criminal 
justice area.9 The balance between these two principles and the protection of fundamental 
rights may be severely affected.10  
Even though EAW was adopted under the “impulse”11 of the events of the 11th of September 
2001, the scope of EAW is not (and never was) limited only to crimes related to terrorism. This 
has led to questions on the proportionality when applying the Framework Decision. It seems 
reasonable to state that the system was founded on the fear of what might happen without 
                                                          
6 Fennelly (2007), p. 519. 
7 This does not mean that there currently no other systems in place in Europe. For example, extradition between 
the Nordic Countries (Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Iceland) takes place in accordance with the Nordic 
Arrest Warrant (NAW), which was implemented after the Framework Decision. 
8 Pirlac (2011), p. 348. 
9 Gáspár-Szilágyi (2016), p. 2. 
10 On a general level the relationship of the EU and fundamental rights happens in three dimensions: 1) self-
constraint, 2) external review, 3) promotion of human rights. See Lawson, Rick: Human Rights: The Best is Yet to 
Come (European Constitutional Law Review 2005, 1(1): p. 27-37, 2005). 
11 Pirlac (2011), p. 351. 
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tools to combat free movement of people, but also on the positive expectation that all 
Member States of the European Union are tied to the common European values. 
 
1.2. Research Question 
Fennelly has suggested that the EAW should be assessed according to three criteria: (1) 
legality; (2) effectiveness; and (3) respect for fundamental rights.12 I will be focusing on the 
third one. With a slight simplification, the steps involved in the EAW process can be pinpointed 
as (i) the issue of the EAW; (ii) the transmission of the EAW; (iii) the arrest of the requested 
person; (iv) a hearing by the executing judicial authority, in accordance with the law of the 
executing member state; and (v) the decision on surrender.13 My research will focus on the 
last step, the decision on surrender. Combining these two aspects, the topic therefore 
revolves around respect for fundamental rights when making the decision on surrender. I 
decided to formulate my research question as follows: 
• how the right to a fair trial limits the execution of a European Arrest Warrant?  
This research is important for slightly different reasons depending on the point of view of the 
reader. From the point of view of Finnish legal study, this research has value because it 
provides answers on how to interpret our national legislation.14 However, from a European 
perspective, it can give context for larger notions of the interplay of mutual trust, fundamental 
rights and procedural cooperation. 
 
1.3. Research Method 
The main research method of this master’s thesis is legal dogmatics (legal doctrinal method) 
which is described as argumentative context analysis.15 According to Aarnio, the tasks of legal 
dogmatic analysis are interpretation and systematisation.16 However, interpretation of EU law 
differs from the interpretation of national law. Several main methods exist for interpreting EU 
legislation.17 Literal interpretation can be considered the starting point. Historic interpretation 
                                                          
12 Fennelly (2007), p. 520. 
13 Fennelly (2007), p. 526. 
14 See chapter 4.3. 
15 Laakso (2012), p. 178. 
16 Aarnio (1978), p. 52. 
17 Joutsamo – Aalto – Kaila – Maunu (2000), p. 299. 
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approach aims to find “the legislator’s meaning”. Systematic interpretation approach puts the 
norm into a larger legal context in which the norm is to function. Comparative approach starts 
with the facts that the norms and case law concerning the same case in different judicial 
systems have their starting point in their own national legal systems. Teleological 
interpretation aims to find the intent and meaning behind the legal order as a whole. 
This thesis approaches the subject first through the right to a fair trial. Secondly, rule of law, 
which has become an integral part of current case law, is discussed. Thirdly, the relevant legal 
framework (both EU and national regulation as well as CJEU’s case law) is detailed. Fourthly, 
the actual criteria for refusal to surrender are examined. Fifthly, comparison between the 
approaches of Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) are examined. Finally, before concluding remarks, significance of mutual trust 
between Member States in relation to the research question is examined. Chapters 7.3. and 
7.4. approach the topic de lege ferenda. 
 
1.4. Terms of “Surrender” and “Extradition” 
The Framework Decision of 2002 introduced a new system of surrender, thus replacing the 
previous, traditional system of extradition between Member States. According to Suominen, 
“surrender” conveys the meaning of mutual recognition of a foreign-issued warrant as 
opposed to the centrally controlled and essentially more discretionary request for 
“extradition”.18 The basic multilateral treaty in the field of extradition is the European 
Convention on Extradition19, adopted by the Council of Europe. Implemented provisions of 
the Framework Decision did not derogate this or any other extradition conventions, nor did 
they provide cancellation. In practice, however, the conventions became obsolete. 20 Without 
prejudice to their application in relations between Member States of the EU and third states, 
the Framework Decision and its surrender based system replaced the corresponding 
provisions of conventions applicable in the field of extradition in relations between Member 
States of the EU. 
                                                          
18 Suominen (2012), p. 594. 
19 European Convention on Extradition (1957) ETS No.024. 
20 Klimek (2011), p. 155. 
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As Klimek21 notes, the surrender procedure is primarily judicial, which means that the political 
phase inherent in the extradition procedure was abolished. In extradition, the provisional 
arrest warrant and the extradition request are two distinct phases of the procedure. The 
request for extradition is made formally through diplomatic channels and the request is then 
examined by the courts. The final decision is taken usually by the executive, to which the 
national law will usually give discretion to refuse the request, subject only to obligations 
provided by the relevant treaty. The Framework Decision’s surrender procedure, however, 
does not distinguish these two phases. The mechanism of the EAW is based on mutual 
recognition. When a judicial authority of a Member State of the EU requests the surrender of 
a person, its decision must be recognised and executed automatically (in principle) throughout 
the EU unless grounds for refusal indicated in the Framework Decision (or national laws 
implementing the Framework Decision) are present. 
There are, however, opposing views. For example, Żurek did not even find the two procedures 
different enough to use the term “surrender” when discussing the EAW.22 However, this is, in 
my view, confusing when the legislator uses the term “surrender”. Even more so, because 
Żurek also stated the following: “Even if we tried, by using these fundamental points of 
difference, to compare EAW with extradition we would find out basically speaking both 
procedures are very alike, but surrendering is less formal. Existing differences between both 
legal instruments do not influence at all on the final effect, which is delivering a person to a 
foreign state.”23 Thus, highlighting the very reason these two different terms exist. 
The final outcome is the same, but the process is simpler in procedure and different in 
principle. Surrender conveys the meaning of a system based on mutual trust, but this is not to 
say that the EAW is not at all influenced by political factors.24 
The lowered significance of central authorities also speaks volumes. According to Article 7(1) 
of the Framework Decision, each Member States may designate a central authority or, when 
its legal system so provides, more than one central authority to assist the competent judicial 
authorities. The Member State may then, if it is necessary as a result of the organisation of its 
internal judicial system, make its central authority, or authorities, responsible for the 
                                                          
21 Klimek (2011), p. 155-156. 
22 Żurek (2012), p. 66. 
23 Żurek (2012), p. 67. 
24 See chapter 7.4. 
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administrative transmission and reception of EAWs as well as for all other official 
correspondence relating thereto (Article 7(2)). These central authorities have only an assisting 
and supporting role to the judicial authorities: the preamble (9) states “[The role of central 
authorities] must be limited to practical and administrative assistance.” 
From a Finnish point of view, the difference might seem inconsequential due to linguistic 
reasons. As noted in the (albeit unofficial) translation of Finland’s Act on Extradition on the 
Basis of an Offence Between Finland and Other Member States of the European Union 
(1286/2003) provided by Finland’s Ministry of Justice, Finnish legal terminology has only one 
term, “luovutus”, to denote the process of turning an alleged fugitive or convicted offender 
over to another state.25 It was noted during the legislative process that the process is in 
essence the same: surrendering a person to another state due to criminal activity.26 The 
Finnish law didn’t, (by a very conscious decision of the legislator), adopt the same exact 
terminology of the Framework Decision, but the one of Finland’s existing legislation as the 
cohesiveness of the Finnish legislation was seen as more important.27 In this research, 
“surrender” will refer to the EAW procedure and “extradition” to refer to the old, treaty-based 
act of surrendering a person to another state. 
  
                                                          
25 Finland’s Ministry of Justice (2006), footnote 1. 
26 HE 88/2003 vp, p. 6. 
27 HE 88/2003 vp, p. 8. 
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2. Right to a Fair Trial in EU 
2.1. The Charter of Fundamental Rights 
The rights of every individual in the EU were established at different times, in different ways 
and in different forms. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union28 (‘the 
Charter’) enshrines the key political, social and economic rights of EU citizens and residents in 
EU law. By stating all fundamental rights in a clear and visible manner, the Charter actually 
contributes in part to the creation of a space of freedom, security and justice and improves 
legal safety regarding the protection of fundamental rights. 
For a long time, the legal status of the Charter remained uncertain. Within the Treaty of Lisbon 
(entered into force on 1 December 2009)29, the provisions of the Charter became compulsory, 
thus gaining the same legal value of that of the EU treaties. This was a major leap forward and 
was made to ensure the Charter’s transformation from soft law into hard law.30 The Charter 
is also important for citizens because the system of fundamental rights is now visible and 
transparent, not a complicated secret for insiders.31  
Akin to national catalogues of rights, the Charter is addressed to institutions and bodies 
belonging to all three classic branches of government (legislative, executive and judicial). That 
said, the judiciary is often considered to have a special responsibility for ensuring fundamental 
rights protection.32  
                                                          
28 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (consolidated version). Official Journal (OJ) C 326, 
26.10.2012, p. 391—40). Jääskinen has described the process of accepting the Charter’s role as follows: “In 
Finland, the attitude towards an EU Bill of rights was at best lukewarm. Its necessity was questioned, there were 
fears that it represented a first step towards a federal constitution of Europe, and many saw it as an attempt to 
prevent the accession of the EU to the ECHR, which was the preferred option for Finland. However, the Finnish 
Parliament stated in 1999 something that seems very important even today. Namely, that if an EU bill of rights 
were adopted, it could and should not be limited to rights protected by the ECHR, the latter being an instrument 
which was five decades old. Therefore, the EU catalogue of fundamental rights should be comprehensive and 
modern, and also protect fundamental societal rights, rights to participation in decision-making, the right to good 
administration and the protection of the environment, and the rights of minorities.” Jääskinen, Niilo: The Place 
of the EU Charter within the Tradition of Fundamental and Human Rights (Morano-Foadi, Sonia – Vickers, Lucy 
(eds.): Fundamental Rights in the EU – A Matter for Two Courts (Hart Publishing 2015, p. 11-20; p. 11) 
29 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community 
(consolidated version). OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, s. 13—390. 
30 de Visser (2013), p. 39-40. 
31 Rossi (2008), p. 78. See also Venables, Tony: The EU Charter – A Missed Opportunity to Respond to Citizens’ 
Concerns (In Feus, Kim (ed.): The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights – text and commentaries. Federal Trust for 
Education and Research 2000, p. 189-196). 
32 de Visser (2013), p. 40. 
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The Charter has been described by Ryland, as “a precondition to effective judicial protection” 
in two ways. Firstly, through the complementary issue of accession to an external human 
rights regime and secondly, in instigating more liberal individual standing requirements in 
order to protect fundamental rights in relation to activities of institutions within the EU.33 The 
Charter covers all the rights found in the case law of the CJEU, the rights and freedoms 
enshrined in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (“the ECHR”)34  and other rights and principles 
resulting from the common constitutional traditions of EU countries and other international 
instruments. 
 
2.2. Defining a Fair Trial 
Title VI of the Charter, headed “Justice”, includes Article 47 which is titled “Right to an 
effective remedy and to a fair trial” and states the following: 
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has 
the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid 
down in this Article. 
Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall have the 
possibility of being advised, defended and represented. 
Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far as such 
aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice.” 
Therefore, the basic building blocks of a fair trial are fairness, a public hearing, reasonable 
time and a tribunal, previously established by law, that is both independent and impartial.35 
The possibility of being advised, defended and represented helps individuals and enforces 
their rights. Available legal aid (Article 47(3)) is also central to guaranteeing a fair trial. Overall, 
the right to a fair trial has almost countless aspects and the CJEU case law is so vast that it is 
impossible to detail all of them. Key areas are examined here. 
Fairness. The principle of equality of arms, a corollary of the concept of a fair hearing, implies 
that each party must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case, including his 
evidence, under conditions that do not place him at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis his 
                                                          
33 Ryland (2003), p. 162-163. 
34 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) ETS 5. 
35 For a look at how fair trial conflicts with other human rights in the case law of ECtHR, see Brems, Eva: Conflicting 
Human Rights: An Exploration in the Context of the Right to a Fair Trial in the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Human Rights Quarterly 2005, 27(1); p. 294-326). 
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opponent.36 Principle of adversarial proceedings means the parties to a case must have the 
right to examine all the documents or observations submitted to the court for the purpose of 
influencing its decision, and to comment on them.37 
A public hearing. A public hearing helps promote confidence in courts by rendering visible and 
transparent the administration of justice. This publicity protects litigants against the 
administration of justice in secret with no public scrutiny; it is also one of the means whereby 
confidence in the courts, superior and inferior, can be maintained. By rendering the 
administration of justice visible, publicity contributes to the achievement of the aim of a fair 
trial.38 Regarding public hearing, the right of the accused to appear in person at his trial is an 
important component, though that right is not absolute.39 
Reasonable time. The reasonable time is appraised in the light of the circumstances specific 
to each case, such as the complexity of the case and the conduct of the parties. The list of 
relevant criteria is not exhaustive and that the assessment of the reasonableness of a period 
does not require a systematic examination of the circumstances of the case in the light of each 
of them, where the duration of the proceedings appears justified in the light of one of them. 
Thus, the complexity of the case or the dilatory conduct of the applicant may be deemed to 
justify a duration which is prima facie too long.40 
Independence. The concept of independence presupposes, in particular, that the body 
concerned exercises its judicial functions wholly autonomously, without being subject to any 
hierarchical constraint or subordinated to any other body and without taking orders or 
instructions from any source whatsoever, and that it is thus protected against external 
interventions or pressure liable to impair the independent judgment of its members and to 
influence their decisions.41 
Impartiality. Impartiality has two aspects: The first aspect, which is external, presumes that 
the body is protected against external intervention or pressure liable to jeopardise the 
independent judgment of its members as regards proceedings before them. That essential 
freedom from such external factors requires certain guarantees sufficient to protect the 
                                                          
36 C-199/11 Europese Gemeenschap v. Otis NV and Others EU:C:2012:684, para. 71. 
37 C-300/11 ZZ v. Secretary of State for the Home Department EU:C:2013:363, para. 55. 
38 See ECtHR’s ruling Pretto v. Italy (8 December 1983), para. 21. Article 47 of the Charter corresponds to Article 6 
of the ECHR on this point. 
39 C-399/11 Stefano Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal EU:C:2013:107, para. 49. 
40 C-58/12 Groupe Gascogne SA v. European Commission EU:C:2013:770, paras. 85–86. 
41 C-216/18 LM EU:C:2018:586, para. 44. 
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person of those who have the task of adjudicating in a dispute, such as guarantees against 
removal from office. The second aspect, which is internal, is linked to impartiality and seeks 
to ensure a level playing field for the parties to the proceedings and their respective interests 
with regard to the subject-matter of those proceedings. That aspect requires objectivity and 
the absence of any interest in the outcome of the proceedings apart from the strict application 
of the rule of law.42 
The second paragraph of Article 47 corresponds to Article 6(1) of the ECHR, which is worded 
as follows: 
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against 
him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced 
publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests 
of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of 
juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent 
strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would 
prejudice the interests of justice.” 
The limitation to the determination of civil rights and obligations or criminal charges in ECHR 
does not apply as regards EU law and its implementation. That is one of the consequences of 
the fact that the Union is a community based on the rule of law.43 Nevertheless, in all respects 
other than their scope, the guarantees afforded by the ECHR apply in a similar way.44 
 
2.3. Essence of the Right 
Article 52(1) (“Scope of guaranteed rights”) of the Charter states that any limitation on the 
exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by the Charter must be provided for by law 
and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of 
proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet 
objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and 
freedoms of others. This is also firmly established in case law.45 
                                                          
42 C-506/04 Graham J. Wilson v. Ordre des avocats du barreau de Luxembourg EU:C:2006:587, para. 50-52. 
43 See chapter 3. 
44 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights. OJ 2007 C 303, p. 17. 
45 See judgments C 300/11 ZZ v. Secretary of State for the Home Department EU:C:2013:363, para. 51; C 562/12 
Liivimaa Lihaveis EU:C:2014:2229, para. 72; C 362/14 Schrems, EU:C:2015:650, para. 95; C 439/14 and C 488/14 
Star Storage and Others EU:C:2016:688, para. 49; C 73/16 Puškár EU:C:2017:725, para. 62; C 664/15 Protect 
Natur-, Arten- und Landschaftsschutz Umweltorganisation EU:C:2017:987, para. 90. 
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Article 47 contains in each paragraph components of the essence: access to a court, judicial 
independence, legal representation, and legal aid among others. Gutman has suggested that 
CJEU’s case law indicates that the essence of the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial 
has an autonomous function apart from proportionality in the context of the application of 
justified limitations to the exercise of that right under Article 52(1) of the Charter. Gutman has 
linked it to national procedural autonomy, equivalence, effectiveness and construction of a 
truly coherent system of judicial protection in the EU. The overarching principle of judicial 
protection46 also plays an important role.47 
Guidance for pinpointing the essence of fair trial can be looked for in the ECHR case law, 
(especially in questions that have not yet been examined by the CJEU). For example, according 
to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) a particularly strict application of a procedural 
rule may sometimes impair the very essence of the right of access to a court48 particularly in 
view of the importance of the appeal and what is at stake in the proceedings for an applicant 
who has been sentenced to a long term of imprisonment.49 Public-interest concerns cannot 
justify measures which extinguish the very essence of an applicant’s defence rights, including 
the privilege against self-incrimination.50  
In ECtHR’s case law, it is established that extradition or expulsion risking a flagrant denial of 
justice can violate Article 6 of the Convention. However, the “flagrant denial of justice” test of 
ECtHR is a stringent one and requires a breach of the principles of a fair trial guaranteed by 
the Convention’s Article 6 that is so fundamental as to amount to a nullification, or destruction 
of the very essence, of the right guaranteed by that Article.51 
 
2.4. Issues with EAW 
Issues with EAW and right to a fair trial were already recognized as early as 2010 in legal 
literature with Spencer drawing attention to several problems: legal advice and legal 
representation that is poor or non-existent, incompetent interpreters and oppressive police 
                                                          
46 See chapter 4.1. 
47 Gutman (2019), p. 903. 
48 Labergère v. France (26 September 2006), para. 23. 
49 Labergère v. France (26 September 2006), para. 20. 
50 Jalloh v. Germany (11 July 2006), § 97. 
51 Ahorugeze v. Sweden (27 October 2011), para. 115; Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom (17 January 
2012), para. 260. See chapter 6. 
12 
 
 
 
practices when dealing with suspects and witnesses.52 European Commission (the 
Commission) published in 2011 a report “on the implementation since 2007 of the Council 
Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender 
procedures between Member States” which highlighted several problems with the EAW, 
especially concerning proportionality and fundamental rights.53 Disproportionate use was 
seen as being undermining to mutual trust and varying standards leading to human rights 
infringements. 
Fair Trials International (FTI), a London-based human rights non-governmental organisation, 
in their 2011 report, “The European Arrest Warrant seven years on – the case for reform”, 
highlighted several problems. If one country refuses to execute an EAW, for example because 
it would breach a person’s right to a fair trial (perhaps due to the amount of time that has 
elapsed since the alleged offence), this does not automatically invalidate the EAW. The 
individual subject to the EAW remains a wanted person and risks re-arrest, further hearings 
and additional legal costs, each time he or she crosses a national border.54 The absence of 
common standards in areas of fundamental procedural rights, bail and pre-trial detention 
represent a threat to the integrity and fair operation of the EAW scheme, in the light of mutual 
trust.55 
Recently FTI completed their "Beyond Surrender" project to document what happens to 
people after they are surrendered. The purpose of the project was to understand the extent 
of concerns identified with the operation of EAW system in practice. The project found that 
the problems with the EAW system continue. FTI highlighted several human rights problems 
with the EAW including: issuing EAWs without taking proportionality into account, surrenders 
despite human rights concerns and persons sought under EAWs not being provided with legal 
representation in the issuing State as well as the executing State.56 
As pre-trial detention falls under the time counted towards “a fair trial in a reasonable time”, 
this is another concerning area of EAW. Research conducted in the project shows that people 
continued to be surrendered under EAWs despite evidence that they will spend lengthy and 
                                                          
52 Spencer (2010), p. 227. 
53 COM(2011) 175 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
implementation since 2007 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant 
and the surrender procedures between Member States. 
54 Fair Trials (2011), p. 6-7. 
55 Fair Trials (2011), p. 23. 
56 Fair Trials (2018), p. 8. 
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unlawful periods in pretrial detention, often because the EAW has been issued to investigate 
the person rather than bring them to trial.57 
FTI also underlined vulnerable suspects and non-existent remedies as especially concerning 
areas. The lack of standards for vulnerable suspects, particularly those with limited intellectual 
capacity is a significant concern.58 The lack of standards governing remedies for rights 
violations is hindering implementation. In many EU Member States, the improper denial of a 
lawyer will lead to no meaningful remedy, with unlawfully obtained evidence able to be used 
to convict the person. This can limit the incentives to comply with EU legislation that 
guarantees fair trial rights.59 
  
                                                          
57 Fair Trials (2018), p. 21. 
58 Fair Trials (2018), p. 24. 
59 Fair Trials (2018), p. 24. 
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3. Rule of Law 
3.1. Relationship with Right to a Fair Trial 
The Treaty on European Union (TEU)60 is one of the primary treaties of the European Union,61 
which forms the basis of EU and sets out general principles of the Union’s purpose, the 
governance of its central institutions, as well as the rules on external, foreign and security 
policy. Following the Treaty of Lisbon,62 the current version of the TEU entered into force in 
2009.63 Article 2 of TEU states that EU is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the 
rights of persons belonging to minorities. 
Rule of law is commonly defined as the restriction of the arbitrary exercise of power by 
subordinating it to well-defined and established laws. The rule of law mainly concerns the 
quality of the law and the existence of adequate procedures.64 Ervo has observed that in ECtHR 
case law, one common criteria for rule of law is the material legal protection achieved through 
procedural legal protection. Therefore, the meaning of requirements of right to a fair trial and 
procedural legal protection is easy to explain with the current principle of rule of law.65 
Necessary elements (which are not only formal but also substantial or material) include (1) 
legality, including a transparent, accountable and democratic process for enacting law; (2) 
legal certainty; (3) prohibition of arbitrariness; (4) access to justice before independent and 
impartial courts, including judicial review of administrative acts; (5) respect for human rights; 
and (6) non-discrimination and equality before the law.66  
There is a great deal of overlap between the rule of law and respect for human rights, but they 
are not necessarily synonymous.67 The ECHR, the Charter and the TEU all refer to the rule of 
law explicitly. The rights most obviously connected to the rule of law include: (1) the right of 
                                                          
60 Treaty on European Union (consolidated version). OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 13—390. 
61 Alongside the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (consolidated version). OJ C 326, 
26.10.2012, p. 47—390. 
62 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community (2007). OJ C 306, 17.12.2007, p. 1–271. 
63 An older form of the same document was implemented by the Maastricht Treaty (1992) (Treaty on European 
Union. OJ C 191, 29.7.1992, p. 1–112).  
64 Lautenbach (2013) p. 175. 
65 Ervo (2005), p. 97. 
66 European Commission for Democracy Through Law: Report on the Rule of Law. CDL-AD(2011)003rev. 
04.04.2011, para. 41. 
67 European Commission for Democracy Through Law: Report on the Rule of Law. CDL-AD(2011)003rev. 
04.04.2011, para. 59. 
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access to justice; (2) the right to a legally competent judge; (3) the right to be heard; (4) 
inadmissibility of double jeopardy (ne bis in idem); (5) the legal principle that measures which 
impose a burden should not have retroactive effects; (6) the right to an effective remedy for 
any arguable claim; (7) anyone accused of a crime is presumed innocent until proven guilty; 
and (8) the right to a fair trial.68 Most of these rights (as well as the principle of independence 
and impartiality of the judiciary) are enshrined in Article 6 of the ECHR.69 
The right to a fair trial can be traced back to the idea of rule of law.70 Article 6 of the ECHR is 
said to reflect the fundamental principle of the rule of law.71 The trial process has also been 
called “a cornerstone” of the rule of law.72 The connection between a minimum standard of 
procedural justice and the rule of law is recognized in virtually all instruments of international 
human rights protection.73  
The relationship between right to a fair trial and rule of law works in two ways. The right to a 
fair trial is of cardinal importance as a guarantee that all the rights which individuals derive 
from EU law will be protected and that the values common to the Member States set out in 
Article 2 TEU, in particular the value of the rule of law, will be safeguarded.74 On the other 
hand, the rule of law itself requires that at least a minimum standard of the right to a fair trial 
is upheld.75 Therefore, although rule of law guarantees a fair trial, a fair trial also works as a 
guarantee of rule of law. Breaches to one or the other give a strong indication that the other 
one is not respected either. 
An example of how damage to a fair trial also damages rule of law can be observed in the 
ECtHR case law. For example, the ECtHR stated in Othman (Abu Qatada) v. The United 
Kingdom that “Fundamentally, no legal system based upon the rule of law can countenance 
the admission of evidence which has been obtained by torture. Torture evidence damages 
                                                          
68 European Commission for Democracy Through Law: Report on the Rule of Law. CDL-AD(2011)003rev. 
04.04.2011, para. 60. 
69 Other rights may also have rule of law connotations, such as the right to expression, which permits criticism of 
the government of the day (Article 10 ECHR) and even rights such as the prohibition on torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment (Article 3), which may be linked to the notion of a fair trial. European 
Commission for Democracy Through Law: Report on the Rule of Law. CDL-AD(2011)003rev. 04.04.2011,  para. 
61. 
70 Ervo (2005) p. 92. 
71 The Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom (26 April 1979), para. 55. 
72 Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom (17 January 2012), para. 264. 
73 Zurn – Nollkaemper - Peerenboom (2012), p. 63. 
74 C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses EU:C:2018:117, para. 48. 
75 Lautenbach (2013), p. 177. 
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irreparably the trial process; it substitutes force for the rule of law and taints the reputation 
of any court that admits it. Torture evidence is excluded to protect the integrity of the trial 
process and, ultimately, the rule of law itself.”76 
 
3.2. Rule of Law Framework 
Article 7 TEU provides the following: 
“1 On a reasoned proposal by one third of the Member States, by the European Parliament 
or by the European Commission, the Council, acting by a majority of four fifths of its 
members after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may determine that 
there is a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the values referred to in 
Article 2. Before making such a determination, the Council shall hear the Member State in 
question and may address recommendations to it, acting in accordance with the same 
procedure. 
The Council shall regularly verify that the grounds on which such a determination was 
made continue to apply. 
2.      The European Council, acting by unanimity on a proposal by one third of the Member 
States or by the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, 
may determine the existence of a serious and persistent breach by a Member State of the 
values referred to in Article 2, after inviting the Member State in question to submit its 
observations. 
3.      Where a determination under paragraph 2 has been made, the Council, acting by a 
qualified majority, may decide to suspend certain of the rights deriving from the 
application of the Treaties to the Member State in question, including the voting rights of 
the representative of the government of that Member State in the Council. In doing so, the 
Council shall take into account the possible consequences of such a suspension on the 
rights and obligations of natural and legal persons. 
The obligations of the Member State in question under the Treaties shall in any case 
continue to be binding on that State.” 
This provision, which was first introduced into the EU Treaties by the Amsterdam Treaty,77 
gives the Council of the EU the power to sanction any member state found “guilty” of a serious 
and persistent breach of the EU values laid down in Article 2 TEU.78 For instance, the Council 
could deprive the relevant member state of certain of the rights it derives from the EU 
Treaties, including the right to vote on EU legal acts submitted to the Council for adoption. 
                                                          
76 Othman (Abu Qatada) v. The United Kingdom (17 January 2012), para. 264. 
77 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities and certain related acts (1997). OJ C 340, 10.11.1997, p. 1–144. 
78 For a comprehensive, yet critical, paper tracing the history of discussions and decisions leading to the 
incorporation of the Article 7 mechanism, see Sadurski, Wojciech: Adding a Bite to a Bark? A Story of Article 7, 
the EU Enlargement, and Jörg Haider (The University of Sydney, Sydney Law School, Legal Studies Research Paper 
no. 10/01 January 2010 available at papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1531393) 
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With the Nice Treaty,79 Article 7 TEU was revised to further enable the EU to adopt preventive 
sanctions in a situation where there is “a clear risk of a serious breach” of the EU values by a 
Member State.80 
Article 7 TEU is not designed as a remedy for individual breaches in specific situations. It is 
solution of last-resort, a concerted action for systemic problems that raise to a certain 
threshold of seriousness and persistence.81 Although activation can ultimately result in the 
suspension of membership rights, the aim of this political mechanisms is not to punish 
Member States but rather to neutralize threats to the rule of law.82 
The enactment of such mechanism can be dually interpreted. On one hand it demonstrated a 
political will to strengthen fundamental rights protection in EU, since the sanction put on 
Member States is quite substantial. On the other hand, this worked as an alternative for the 
adoption of a catalogue of rights in the EU.83 According to Margaritis, the makers of the TEU 
decided to work more on negative integration method by adding an obligation of the Member 
States to avoid serious and persistent violations of rights, rather than taking positive actions 
for further protection in EU level.84 
A risk of serious breach must be “clear”, excluding purely contingent risks from the scope of 
the prevention mechanism.85 The serious breach criterion is common to the prevention and 
the penalty mechanisms: the clear risk must be that of a “serious” breach and the breach itself 
when it occurs must be “serious”. To determine the seriousness of the breach, a variety of 
criteria will have to be considered, including the purpose and the result of the breach.86  
 
                                                          
79 Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities 
and certain related acts (2001). OJ C 80, 10.3.2001, p. 1–87. 
80 Kochenov – Pech (2015), p. 516. 
81 Larion (2018), p. 163. 
82 Uitz (2019), p. 3.  
83 Margaritis (2013), p. 144. However, the predominantly political nature of Article TEU 7 is indicated by the fact 
that the Council is actually under no legal obligation to take further action even in a situation where it concludes 
that a member is in breach of Article TEU values. See Kochenov – Pech (2015). p. 516. 
84 Margaritis (2013), p. 144. 
85 COM(2003) 606 final Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on 
Article 7 of the Treaty on the European Union. Respect for and promotion of the values on which the Union is 
based, p. 7. 
86 COM(2003) 606 final Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on 
Article 7 of the Treaty on the European Union. Respect for and promotion of the values on which the Union is 
based, p. 8. 
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3.3. Rule of Law Backsliding 
The rule of law is essential for the functioning of the EU as a whole, but especially concerning 
cooperation in the area of Justice and Home Affairs. “Rule of law backsliding” has been 
described as the process through which elected public authorities deliberately implement 
governmental blueprints which aim to systematically weaken, annihilate or capture internal 
checks on power with the view of dismantling the liberal democratic state and entrenching 
the long-term rule of the dominant party.87 
From the perspective of EU institutions, the most problematic aspect of rule of law backsliding 
concerns current attacks by populist governments on the judiciary. These governments take 
measures dismantling the system of checks and balances that safeguard the independence of 
courts and judges. This threaten the rule of law in two ways: I) They endanger the 
independence and impartiality of courts; and II) they put at risk the realisation of the right to 
a fair trial. The consequence of such an attack is twofold for EU law: 1) The removal of certain 
institutional or procedural guarantees of the independence of courts and judges undermines 
the effective enforcement of EU law; 2) it undermines the effective protection of fundamental 
rights in the Member States to the extent that they hinge on judicial protection (specifically 
on access to a fair trial by an independent court).88 
Rule of law backsliding has unfortunately been observed in Poland and Hungary. Through the 
years, this process finally lead to the TEU 7 dialogue mechanism for safeguarding the rule of 
law being activated for the first time, in respect of Poland, in January 2016.89 European 
Parliament on 12 September 2018 gave their resolution on a proposal calling on the Council 
to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a 
clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded.90 
Similar concerns have also been raised in relation to Romania and Bulgaria. On 10 May 2019, 
Frans Timmermans, then Vice-president of the Commission, sent a letter to the Romanian 
government, in which he discussed the rule of law developments in Romania. Within it, he 
                                                          
87 Pech – Scheppele (2017), p. 10. 
88 Bárd - Śledzińska-Simon (2019), p. 4. 
89 COM(2017) 835 final Proposal for a COUNCIL DECISION on the determination of a clear risk of a serious 
breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law. 
90 P8_TA(2018)0340 European Parliament resolution of 12 September 2018 on a proposal calling on the Council 
to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious 
breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded (2017/2131(INL)). 
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warned that if the Romanian government does not withdraw the recent legislative 
amendments undermining the effective fight against corruption in the country, the 
Commission would initiate procedures under the rule of law framework.91  
Bulgaria’s situation has not caused the EU to take action yet, but significant concerns have 
been raised regarding government interference in the justice system and legislative 
arbitrariness.92 These developments in multiple Member States raise major concerns about 
the issue of surrendering suspects to Member States where rule of law and right to fair trial 
are compromised.93 
  
                                                          
91 Timmermans (2019). 
92 Vassileva (2019). 
93 Katalin Miklóssy examined the situation in her article “Oikeusvaltion ahdinko vai yhteen sopimattomat 
käsitteet? Tarkastelussa itäiset EU-maa” (Lakimies 7-8/2018, p. 1066-1072) mentioning Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, Bulgaria and even Czech and Slovakia as troubling examples. Miklóssy argued that countries in Eastern 
Europe are creating an exceptionally stable system that can’t be changed with conventional democratic methods. 
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4. Relevant Legal Context 
4.1. Judicial protection, a Meta-Norm 
The principle of the effective judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law is a general 
principle stemming from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, which 
has been enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of ECHR, and which is now reaffirmed by Article 47 of 
the Charter.94 Roeben has argued that judicial protection also serves as the meta-norm for 
governing the EU judicial architecture resting on two pillars; the EU judicature and the 
Member States judicatures.95 This meta-norm then becomes further institutionalised, through 
the TEU, the Charter, and the related doctrine of the CJEU.  
According to Roeben, Article 47 of the Charter formalises a fundamental right of judicial 
protection at the core of judicial protection and then also is the individual right.96 By balancing 
the principle of effective rights protection with any countervailing general objectives of an 
orderly procedure, CJEU is then responsible for concretising this fundamental right into 
requirements. These requirements then become standards for the procedure legislatures of 
the EU and the Member States.   
Roeben continues stating that institutional judicial protection becomes a hard or formal meta-
norm within the primary law and therefore, the Treaties (and even less secondary law) must 
not include rules incompatible with an effective protection of individual rights.97 In Roeben’s 
view, judicial protection overrides all conflicting principles that aim to preserve non-justiciable 
decision-making of the EU’s political institutions, the procedural autonomy of the Member 
States, or even their mutual trust. This elevated, constitutional status of judicial protection 
can be justified, as a matter of positive law and normatively; judicial protection aims to make 
human dignity actual rather than simply aspirational. This protection includes all rights-
holders in the process of European integration. 
Conway has provided a differing view: 98 
“Along with the rule of law and democracy, the other principle of political morality 
articulated as part of the self-identity of the EU polity is human rights, which have been 
treated in some literature as modifying or qualifying an untrammeled democratic 
                                                          
94 C-619/18 European Commission v. Republic of Poland EU:C:2019:531, para. 49. 
95 Roeben (2019), p. 32. 
96 Roeben (2019), p. 32. 
97 Roeben (2019), p. 33. 
98 Conway (2012) p. 278. 
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principle. This counter-majoritarian character of human rights does not have to and should 
not amount to reconfiguring the judicial branch as having an autonomous law-creating 
and polity-building counter-majoritarian role. The counter-majoritarian implications of 
fundamental human rights are best understood in the context of a constitutional moment 
of entrenchment, which is itself democratically legitimated at the adoption of a 
constitution: the policy commits itself, at a moment of special deliberation, to human 
rights applicable to all, which may not be undermined by temporary legislative majorities. 
In this way, human rights protection in the context of constitutional review should not be 
equated with a simple counter-majoritarian principle, as if a counter-majoritarian writ 
large was thus somehow inevitably a feature of constitutional review.” 
Even though mutual trust and mutual recognition between Member States form the 
foundation of the EAW system, judicial protection should override even them when effective 
judicial protection is at stake. This principle has not always been fulfilled.99 Judicial protection 
serves as the principle which guides the interpretation of EAW’s legal context. 
 
4.2. Framework Decision 
The Framework Decision100 was drafted by the Council, which consists of State Ministers for 
particular area – in this case, the Ministers of the Interior. The establishment of the EAW 
replaced the extradition institution in the relations of cooperation in criminal matters 
between Member States of the EU.  
The Framework Decision was adopted on the basis of the former third pillar of the EU, in 
particular, under TEU’s (as amended by the Maastricht Treaty) Article 34(2)(b).101 According 
to Article 34(2)(b), the Council “shall take measures and promote cooperation, using the 
appropriate form and procedures as set out in this title, contributing to the pursuit of the 
objectives of the Union. To that end, acting unanimously on the initiative of any Member State 
or of the Commission, the Council may adopt framework decisions for the purpose of 
approximation of the laws and regulations of the Member States. Framework decisions shall 
be binding upon the Member States as to the result to be achieved but shall leave to the 
national authorities the choice of form and methods. They shall not entail direct effect.” 
                                                          
99 See chapters 4.4.1. and 4.4.2. 
100 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the 
surrender procedures between Member States - Statements made by certain Member States on the adoption 
of the Framework Decision. OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, p. 1–20. 
101 Framework decisions were available as legislative instruments to the Union from 1 May 1999 (Treaty of 
Amsterdam entered into force) until 1 December 2009 (Treaty of Lisbon entered into force). 
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The main advantage of framework decisions was the speed with which they could land 
themselves onto national systems and they also had all the flexibility of directives with the 
same discretion left to national systems to choose the format and means to arrive at the 
prescribed goals. However, was this kind of flexibility out of place in a of criminal law which is 
traditionally governed by the strict application of the principle of legality?102 
When assessing the research question, the Framework Decision’s recitals are important for 
providing information on the meaning of the aims of the EAW system. Recital 5 provides that 
the introduction of a new simplified system of surrender of sentenced or suspected persons 
for the purposes of execution or prosecution of criminal sentences made it possible to remove 
the complexity and potential for delay inherent in the extradition procedures. 
EAW is the first concrete measure in the field of criminal law implementing the principle of 
mutual recognition which the European Council referred to as the “cornerstone” of judicial 
cooperation (the Framework Decision’s Recital 6). Since the aim of replacing the system of 
multilateral extradition cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States acting 
unilaterally and can therefore, by reason of its scale and effects, be better achieved at Union 
level, the Council may adopt measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, but in 
accordance with the principle of proportionality, the Framework Decision does not go beyond 
what is necessary in order to achieve that objective (the Framework Decision’s Recital 7). 
Decisions on the execution of the EAW must be subject to sufficient controls, which means 
that a judicial authority of the Member State where the requested person has been arrested 
will have to take the decision on his or her surrender (the Framework Decision’s Recital 8). As 
stated in the Framework Decision’s Recital 10, the mechanism of the EAW is based on a high 
level of confidence between Member States and its implementation may be suspended only 
in “the event of a serious and persistent breach by one of the Member States of the principles 
set out in Article 6(1) [now, after amendment, Article 2 TEU], determined by the [European] 
Council pursuant to Article 7(1) [now, after amendment, Article 7(2) TEU,] with the 
consequences set out in Article 7(2) thereof [now, after amendment, Article 7(3) TEU].” 
Human rights provisions 
According to Pérignon – Daucé, the EAW contributes to the protection of the fundamental 
rights of the requested person in two main aspects. First, the EAW was drafted and adopted 
                                                          
102 Impala (2005) p. 59-60. 
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with careful regard to compliance with the fundamental rights of the requested person. 
Secondly, the Framework Decisions contains specific provisions designed to restate and, in 
some cases, strengthen specific rights of the requested persons guaranteed by national law.103 
The Framework Decision respects fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised 
by Article 6 TEU and reflected in the Charter, in particular Chapter VI thereof. Nothing in the 
Framework Decision may be interpreted as prohibiting refusal to surrender a person for whom 
a EAW has been issued when there are reasons to believe, on the basis of objective elements, 
that the EAW has been issued for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on the 
grounds of his or her sex, race, religion, ethnic origin, nationality, language, political opinions 
or sexual orientation, or that that person’s position may be prejudiced for any of these reasons 
(the Framework Decision’s Recital 12). No person should be removed, expelled or extradited 
to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, 
torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (the Framework Decision’s 
Recital 13). 
According to Article 1(2) of the Framework Decision, Member States shall execute any EAW 
on the basis of the principle of mutual recognition and in accordance with the provisions of 
the Framework Decision. Article 1(3) guarantees that the Framework Decision does not have 
the effect of modifying the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal 
principles as enshrined in Article 6 [EU]. Respect for fundamental rights is routinely 
proclaimed in other EU legal instruments governing criminal justice cooperation.104 
It follows that the provisions of the Framework Decision themselves provide for a procedure 
that complies with the requirements of Article 47 of the Charter, regardless of the methods 
of implementing the Framework Decision chosen by the Member States.105 
Supplying information 
Article 7(1) of the Framework Decision, titled “Recourse to the central authority”, provides 
that each Member State may designate a central authority or, when its legal system so 
provides, more than one central authority to assist the competent judicial authorities. Article 
7(2) states that a Member State may, if it is necessary as a result of the organisation of its 
internal judicial system, make its central authority (or authorities) responsible for the 
                                                          
103 Pérignon - Daucé (2007), p. 212. 
104 Anagnostopoulos (2014), p. 16. 
105 C-168/13 Jeremy F EU:C:2013:358, para. 47. 
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administrative transmission and reception of EAWs as well as for all other official 
correspondence relating thereto. Member State wishing to make use of the possibilities 
referred to in Article 7 shall communicate to the General Secretariat of the Council 
information relating to the designated central authority or central authorities. These 
indications are binding upon all the authorities of the issuing Member State. 
Article 15(1) of Framework Decision (titled “Surrender decision”) guarantees that the 
executing judicial authority shall decide, within the time limits and under the conditions 
defined in the Framework Decision, whether the person is to be surrendered. Article 15(2) 
states that if the executing judicial authority finds the information communicated by the 
issuing Member State to be insufficient to allow it to decide on surrender, it shall request that 
the necessary supplementary information, in particular with respect to Articles 3 to 5 and 
Article 8, be furnished as a matter of urgency and may fix a time limit for the receipt thereof, 
taking into account the need to observe the time limits set in Article 17.106 
 
4.3. National Legislation 
The Framework Decision had to be first transposed into national legislation before coming 
into force, because as legislative instruments framework decisions were not directly 
applicable in Member States. However, the Member States were free to choose the form and 
method to achieve the objectives set out in the Framework Decision.  
It is also settled case law that although framework decisions may not entail direct effect, as 
laid down in Article 34(2)(b) EU, their binding character nevertheless places on national 
authorities, and in particular on national courts, an obligation to interpret national law in 
conformity with EU law.107 
When national courts apply domestic law, they are bound to interpret it, so far as possible, in 
the light of the wording and the purpose of the Framework Decision in order to achieve the 
result sought by it. This obligation to interpret national law in conformity with EU law is 
inherent in the system of the TFEU, since it permits national courts, for the matters within 
                                                          
106 See chapter 5.2.1.  
107 C-554/14 Ognyanov EU:C:2016:835, para. 58. See also C-42/11 Da Silva Jorge EU:C:2012:517, para. 53 and the 
case law cited. 
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their jurisdiction, to ensure the full effectiveness of EU law when they rule on the disputes 
before them.108 
Finland’s Act on Extradition on the Basis of an Offence Between Finland and Other Member 
States of the European Union (1286/2003) was implemented to adopt the Framework 
Decision. The main procedural change was that the deciding institution was changed from 
Ministry of Justice to the District Court of Helsinki as the Framework Decision intended for the 
judicial officials to make the surrender decisions.109 A major change on the substance of the 
legislation was that Finnish citizens can be surrendered to other Member States on the same 
grounds as other persons.110 
Provided that the application of the Framework Decision is not frustrated, it does not prevent 
a Member State from applying its constitutional rules relating inter alia to respect for the right 
to a fair trial.111 Finland emphasized its commitment to human rights and to a fair trial when 
drafting the national legislation. Finnish law states in Chapter 2 Section 5 (“Grounds for 
mandatory refusal”) that extradition shall be refused if: 
6) there is justifiable ground to suspect that the requested person is threatened by capital 
punishment, torture or other degrading treatment or that he or she would be subjected, 
on the basis of origin, membership in a certain social group, religion, belief or political 
opinion, to persecution that threatens his or her life or liberty or to other persecution, or 
there is justifiable cause to assume that he or she would be subjected to a violation of his 
or her human rights or constitutionally protected due process [emphasized here], freedom 
of speech or freedom of association. 
The Framework Decision’s surrender refusal grounds Articles 3 and 4 don’t explicitly include 
this kind of rule. Finnish legislator derived the rule from other parts of the Framework Decision 
as well as Finland’s human rights commitments in force in surrender procedures under the 
Framework Decision. 112 
The above rule should be used in very rare occasions and with caution when applying. There 
should be a justifiable and objective suspicion of threatening persecution towards life or 
freedom or other type of persecution or then a breach of the persons constitutional or human 
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rights. The starting point is that the Member State requesting surrender is obliged to follow 
human rights and is, in the end, responsible of possible violations to the ECtHR.113 
This rule can be based on Framework Decision Article 1(3) which guarantees that the 
Framework Decision does not have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect the 
enshrined fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles.114 It is only natural that also 
the case law of ECtHR has to be accounted for when interpreting the meaning of human 
rights.115 The rule can also be traced back to Recitals 12 and 13 of the Framework Decision.116 
The refusal on the basis of due process should only be used in very rare cases considering that 
it concerns surrendering persons inside the EU.117  
The Commission has called the introduction of grounds not provided for in the Framework 
Decision “disturbing”. According to the Commission, the explicit grounds of refusal for 
violation of fundamental rights (Article 1(3)) or discrimination (Recitals 12 and 13), which two 
thirds of the Member States have chosen to introduce expressly in various forms, is not an 
issue. However legitimate they may be, apart from where they exceed the Framework 
Decision, these grounds should be invoked only in exceptional circumstances within the EU.118 
 
4.4. Evolution of CJEU’s Case Law 
4.4.1. Radu – 29 January 2013 
For a long time, CJEU held on to the principle of mutual recognition, which underpins the 
Framework Decision and to the view that in accordance with Article 1(2) of the Framework 
Decision, the Member States are in principle obliged to act upon a EAW. They must or may 
refuse to execute a EAW only in the cases listed in Articles 3 and 4.119 Radu judgment was a 
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late example of this, but the Advocate General’s (AG) opinion already expressed a different 
view.120 
Radu, a Romanian national, was subject to four EAWs, issued by the German judicial authority 
for the purpose of conducting criminal prosecutions for acts of robbery. Radu did not consent 
to his surrender and claimed that the EAWs were issued without him having been summoned 
or having had a possibility of hiring a lawyer or presenting his defence, in breach of Articles 47 
and 48 of the Charter and Article 6 of the ECHR. 
The Constanţa Court of Appeal in Romania, the referring court, essentially asked the CJEU, 
whether the referring court is entitled to examine whether the issue of a EAW complies with 
fundamental rights with a view, if that is not the case, to refusing its execution, even if that 
ground for non-execution is provided for neither in the Framework Decision nor in the national 
legislation which transposed that decision.121 The ECJ then ruled that the Framework Decision 
must be interpreted as meaning that the executing judicial authorities cannot refuse to 
execute a EAW issued for the purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution on the ground 
that the requested person was not heard in the issuing Member State before that EAW was 
issued. 
The judgment different significantly from the opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in which 
she wrote that “The competent judicial authority of the Member State executing a European 
arrest warrant can refuse the request for surrender without being in breach of the obligations 
authorised by the founding Treaties and the other provisions of European Union law, where 
it is shown that the human rights of the person whose surrender is requested have been 
infringed, or will be infringed, as part of or following the surrender process. However, such a 
refusal will be competent only in exceptional circumstances.”122 
Sharpston’s opinion is more in line with the later case law than the actual ECJ’s judgment in 
Radu which emphasized mutual trust over fundamental rights: “Framework Decision 
2002/584 thus seeks, by the establishment of a new simplified and more effective system for 
the surrender of persons convicted or suspected of having infringed criminal law, to facilitate 
and accelerate judicial cooperation with a view to contributing to the objective set for the 
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European Union to become an area of freedom, security and justice by basing itself on the 
high degree of confidence which should exist between the Member States.”123 
 
4.4.2. Melloni – 26 February 2013  
The request for a preliminary ruling was made in proceedings between Stefano Melloni, and 
the Ministerio Fiscal concerning the execution of a EAW issued by the Italian authorities for 
the execution of a prison sentence handed down by judgment in absentia against Melloni. The 
referring court decided to stay the proceedings and to refer three questions to the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) for a preliminary ruling. The ECJ reformulated the questions as follows: 
“(i). Must Article 4a(1) of the Framework Decision be interpreted as precluding national 
judicial authorities, in the circumstances specified in that provision, from making the 
execution of a EAW conditional upon the conviction in question being open to review, in 
order to guarantee the rights of defence of the person requested under the warrant? 
(ii). In the event of the first question being answered in the affirmative, is Article 4a(1) of 
the Framework Decision compatible with the requirements deriving from the right to an 
effective judicial remedy and to a fair trial, provided for in Article 47 of the Charter and 
from the rights of defence guaranteed under Article 48(2) of the Charter? 
(iii). In the event of the second question being answered in the affirmative, does Article 
53 of the Charter, interpreted schematically in conjunction with the rights recognised 
under Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter, allow a Member State to make the surrender of 
a person convicted in absentia conditional upon the conviction being open to review in 
the requesting State, thus affording those rights a greater level of protection than that 
deriving from European Union law, in order to avoid an interpretation which restricts or 
adversely affects a fundamental right recognised by the constitution of the first-
mentioned Member State?” 
The ECJ ruled that Article 4a(1) of the Framework Decision must be interpreted as precluding 
the executing judicial authorities, in the circumstances specified in that provision, from making 
the execution of a EAW issued for the purposes of executing a sentence conditional upon the 
conviction rendered in absentia being open to review in the issuing Member State. The Court 
also ruled that Article 4a(1) of the Framework Decision is compatible with the requirements 
under Articles 47 and 48(2) of the Charter and that Article 53 of the Charter must be 
interpreted as not allowing a Member State to make the surrender of a person convicted in 
absentia conditional upon the conviction being open to review in the issuing Member State, 
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in order to avoid an adverse effect on the right to a fair trial and the rights of the defence 
guaranteed by its constitution. 
The judgment clearly (as did Radu) emphasized mutual trust over fundamental rights and 
differing from the non-execution grounds listed in the Framework Decision with the ECJ 
stating: 
“Consequently, allowing a Member State to avail itself of Article 53 of the Charter to make 
the surrender of a person convicted in absentia conditional upon the conviction being 
open to review in the issuing Member State, a possibility not provided for under 
Framework Decision 2009/299, in order to avoid an adverse effect on the right to a fair 
trial and the rights of the defence guaranteed by the constitution of the executing 
Member State, by casting doubt on the uniformity of the standard of protection of 
fundamental rights as defined in that framework decision, would undermine the 
principles of mutual trust and recognition which that decision purports to uphold and 
would, therefore, compromise the efficacy of that framework decision.”124 
 
4.4.3. Aranyosi and Căldăraru –  5 April 2016 
A major turning point in CJEU’s case law occurred in 2016 when the Court gave their ruling in 
joined cases Aranyosi and Căldăraru.125 Aranyosi, a Hungarian national, was requested for two 
counts of burglary. Aranyosi’s counsel requested to refuse the surrender of Aranyosi because 
the Public Prosecutor didn’t specify a correctional facility and that, for this reason, it would 
have been impossible to verify the detention conditions to which Aranyosi would have been 
subjected. In Căldăraru, just as in Aranyosi, the Higher Regional Court Bremen was convinced 
that, given the information available to the court, there were strong indications that surrender 
of Căldăraru, a Romanian national, would expose him to detention conditions in violation of 
Article 3 ECHR, the fundamental rights, and general principles enshrined in Article 6 TEU.  
In both of these cases the court was unable to decide whether surrender was permissible, 
based on Article 1(3) of the Framework Decision. For this reason, the Higher Regional Court 
Bremen decided to stay the proceedings and refer the CJEU. The ECJ joined the two cases 
together for the purposes of judgment. The ECJ stated that the referring court sought, in 
essence, to ascertain whether Article 1(3) of the Framework Decision must be interpreted as 
meaning that, where there is solid evidence that detention conditions in the issuing Member 
State are incompatible with fundamental rights, in particular with Article 4 of the Charter, the 
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executing judicial authority may or must refuse to execute a EAW issued in respect of a person 
for the purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution or executing a custodial sentence, or 
whether it may or must make the surrender of that person conditional on there being 
obtained from the issuing Member State information enabling it to be satisfied that those 
detention conditions are compatible with fundamental rights. Further, the referring court 
sought to ascertain whether Articles 5 and 6(1) of the Framework Decision must be 
interpreted as meaning that such information may be supplied by the judicial authority of the 
issuing Member State or whether the supply of that information is governed by the domestic 
rules of competence in that Member State. 
ECJ ruled that: 
“-- Article 1(3), Article 5 and Article 6(1) of the Framework Decision must be interpreted 
as meaning that where there is objective, reliable, specific and properly updated evidence 
with respect to detention conditions in the issuing Member State that demonstrates that 
there are deficiencies, which may be systemic or generalised, or which may affect certain 
groups of people, or which may affect certain places of detention, the executing judicial 
authority must determine, specifically and precisely, whether there are substantial 
grounds to believe that the individual concerned by a European arrest warrant, issued for 
the purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution or executing a custodial sentence, will 
be exposed, because of the conditions for his detention in the issuing Member State, to a 
real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment, within the meaning of Article 4 of the 
Charter, in the event of his surrender to that Member State. To that end, the executing 
judicial authority must request that supplementary information be provided by the issuing 
judicial authority, which, after seeking, if necessary, the assistance of the central authority 
or one of the central authorities of the issuing Member State, under Article 7 of the 
Framework Decision, must send that information within the time limit specified in the 
request. The executing judicial authority must postpone its decision on the surrender of 
the individual concerned until it obtains the supplementary information that allows it to 
discount the existence of such a risk. If the existence of that risk cannot be discounted 
within a reasonable time, the executing judicial authority must decide whether the 
surrender procedure should be brought to an end.”126 
ECJ ruled that the execution of that warrant must be postponed but it cannot be 
abandoned.127 The ruling, therefore, did not set an absolute prohibition on surrender. It also 
left open the possibility that Member States provide information that is not fully accurate to 
one-another, resulting in surrender despite valid concerns. FTI has demanded the Framework 
Decision needs to be amended to fully guarantee this right.128  
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Aranyosi marked, according to Hong, a remarkable change in tone and posture compared to 
Melloni: whereas Melloni was all about the Framework Decision being conclusive and 
excluding any individualised review, Aranyosi is all about the need to secure fundamental 
rights in an individual case.129 Caeiro –  Finaldo – Prata Rodrigues stress that the judgment 
was, in many respects, a one-of-a-kind decision, but it brought up important aspects:130 (i) The 
protection of individual rights can be an actual obstacle to surrender pursuant to a EAW; (ii) 
The presumption underlying mutual trust (and hence mutual recognition) can be rebutted. 
The judgment was a landmark decision as it established for the first time that fundamental 
rights can work as grounds for non-execution of a EAW even though not listed as such in the 
Framework Decision. However, the judgment left a number of uncertainties. Most 
importantly, could other fundamental rights than non-derogable ones offer the same 
possibility and if so, what is the threshold? Before the ECJ got to answer these questions, it 
had to provide an important judgment on rule of law and the independence of judiciary.131 
 
4.4.4. Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses – 27 February 2018 
In Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses,132 the request was made in proceedings between 
the Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses (Trade Union of Portuguese Judges) and 
Portugal’s Court of Auditors, concerning the temporary reduction in the amount of 
remuneration paid to that court’s members, in the context of the Portugal’s budgetary policy 
guidelines. The Supreme Administrative Court referred the following question to the CJEU for 
a preliminary ruling: 
“In view of the mandatory requirements of eliminating the excessive budget deficit and 
of financial assistance regulated by … rules [of EU law], must the principle of judicial 
independence, enshrined in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, in Article 47 of 
the [Charter] and in the case-law of the Court of Justice, be interpreted as meaning that 
it precludes the measures to reduce remuneration that are applied to the judiciary in 
Portugal, where they are imposed unilaterally and on an ongoing basis by other 
constitutional authorities and bodies, as is the consequence of Article 2 of Law 
[No 75/2014]?” 
By its question, the referring court sought, in essence, to ascertain whether the second 
subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU (“Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to 
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ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law.”) must be interpreted as 
meaning that the principle of judicial independence precludes general salary-reduction 
measures linked to requirements to eliminate an excessive budget deficit and to an EU 
financial assistance programme, from being applied to the members of a Member State’s 
judiciary.  
ECJ ruled that the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU must be interpreted as meaning 
that the principle of judicial independence does not preclude general salary-reduction 
measures, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, linked to requirements to eliminate 
an excessive budget deficit and to an EU financial assistance programme, from being applied 
to the members of the Court of Auditors. 
Importance of the judgment, in relation to the research question, is based on several key 
points. Firstly, the very existence of effective judicial review designed to ensure compliance 
with EU law is of the essence of the rule of law.133 Secondly, it follows that every Member 
State must ensure that the bodies which, as “courts or tribunals” within the meaning of EU 
law, come within its judicial system in the fields covered by that law, meet the requirements 
of effective judicial protection.134 Finally, in order for that protection to be ensured, 
maintaining such a court or tribunal’s independence is essential, as confirmed by the second 
subparagraph of Article 47 of the Charter, which refers to the access to an “independent” 
tribunal as one of the requirements linked to the fundamental right to an effective remedy.135 
 
4.4.5. LM – 25 July 2018 
LM ruling brought the case law detailed in previous chapters to its current conclusion.136 In 
2013, Polish courts issued three EAWs against the person concerned and on 5 May 2017 the 
person concerned was arrested in Ireland on the basis of those EAWs and brought before the 
referring court, the High Court of Ireland. He informed that court that he did not consent to 
his surrender to the Polish judicial authorities and was placed in custody pending a decision 
on his surrender.137 
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In support of his opposition to being surrendered, the person concerned submitted, inter alia, 
that his surrender would expose him to a real risk of a flagrant denial of justice in 
contravention of Article 6 of the ECHR (right to a fair trial). In this connection, he contended, 
in particular, that the recent legislative reforms of the system of justice in Poland denied him 
his right to a fair trial. In his submission, those changes fundamentally undermine the basis of 
the mutual trust between the authority issuing the EAW and the executing authority, calling 
the operation of the EAW mechanism into question.138 The person concerned relied on a 
reasoned proposal adopted by the Commission pursuant to Article 7(1) TEU in order for the 
Council to determine that there is a clear risk of a serious breach by that Member State of the 
values referred to in Article 2 TEU, such as that of the rule of law, on account, in particular, of 
actions impairing the independence of the national courts.139 
The High Court of Ireland referred two questions to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. The ECJ 
then, after consideration, ruled that Article 1(3) of the Framework Decision must be 
interpreted as meaning that, where the executing judicial authority, called upon to decide 
whether a person in respect of whom a EAW has been issued for the purposes of conducting 
a criminal prosecution is to be surrendered, has material, such as that set out in a reasoned 
proposal of the European Commission adopted pursuant to Article 7(1) TEU, indicating that 
there is a real risk of breach of the fundamental right to a fair trial guaranteed by the second 
paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, on account of systemic or generalised deficiencies so 
far as concerns the independence of the issuing Member State’s judiciary, that authority must 
determine, specifically and precisely, whether, having regard to his personal situation, as well 
as to the nature of the offence for which he is being prosecuted and the factual context that 
form the basis of the EAW, and in the light of the information provided by the issuing Member 
State pursuant to Article 15(2) of the Framework Decision, there are substantial grounds for 
believing that that person will run such a risk if he is surrendered to that State. 
If the executing judicial authority cannot discount the existence of a real risk that the individual 
concerned will suffer in the issuing Member State a breach of the essence of his fundamental 
right to a fair trial, the executing judicial authority must refrain from giving effect to the EAW 
relating to the person.140 
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As Advocate General in LM expressed that the executing judicial authority can be required to 
postpone the execution of a EAW only if there is a real risk of breach not of the right to a fair 
trial but of the essence of that right.141 An important part of justification in LM was based on 
the Associacao Sindical dos Juizes Portugueses in which the ECJ directly pointed out that a 
Member State’s judicial structure must be seen as an important part of guaranteeing the 
fundamental right to a fair trial regardless of whether such a structure is under the scope or 
direct protection of EU secondary law or not.142 
The LM judgment identified some structural aspects of the control of judiciary that may be 
considered, according to Sadurski, as “symptoms of defects” in guaranteeing the 
independence of judges that read like direct reference to what has in Poland.143 The LM 
judgment may be seen as a judicial legitimization of the Commission’s actions under the rule 
of law framework. It may also be recognized as grounds for a future ruling in the cases 
submitted by the Commission or initiated by the Polish Supreme Court’s preliminary 
references concerning the “reform” of the judiciary in Poland. The ECJ’s repeated references 
to the case of Associacao Sindical dos Juizes Portugueses might suggest such a future line of 
case law.144 
After ECJ’s LM ruling, the Irish High Court concluded that the systemic and generalised 
deficiencies in the independence of the judiciary in Poland of themselves did not reach the 
threshold of amounting to a real risk that there would have been a flagrant denial of the 
requested individual’s right to a fair trial. The Irish Court also concluded that, despite adverse 
comments on his presumption of innocence made by the Deputy Minister of Justice, the real 
risk had not been established. On that basis, the Irish High Court ordered his surrender on 
each of the three EAWs.145 
While the LM judgment might not be a major change on a EU level as it sets very stringent 
conditions on the non-execution, however, when compared to Radu, the difference is clear as 
day. In just five years, CJEU went from giving mutual trust and cooperation seemingly 
unbeatable precedence to admitting that derogable human rights can, under strict conditions, 
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lead to a non-execution of a EAW, a judicial tool based on mutual trust. However, “a ripple 
effect” may be expected.146 
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5. Assessing the Surrender 
5.1. Two-Step Approach 
An important practical tool for judicial authorities to start making the legal assessment (along 
the legal sources mentioned in the previous chapter) is the European Commission’s 
“Handbook on how to issue and execute a European arrest warrant”, which was last updated 
in the fall of 2017.147 According to the preface, it takes into account the experience gained 
over the years of application of the EAW in the Union. The purpose of the handbook’s revisions 
is to update the handbook and make it more comprehensive and more user-friendly. The 
Commission consulted various stakeholders and experts, including Eurojust, the Secretariat of 
the European Judicial Network, and Member States’ government experts and judicial 
authorities. 
The Council and the Commission may believe that they can do maintenance on the EAW by 
amending the Handbook related to the EAW.148 However, as the handbook’s disclaimer states, 
it is neither legally binding nor exhaustive and without prejudice to existing EU law and its 
future development. It is also without prejudice to the authoritative interpretation of EU law 
which may be given by the CJEU. Nevertheless, it can be viewed as guiding. 
The executing judicial authority shall decide, within the time-limits and under the conditions 
defined in the Framework Decision, whether the person is to be surrendered (Article 15(1) 
“Surrender decision”). The Framework Decision’s Article 3 (“Grounds for mandatory non-
execution of the European arrest warrant”), Article 4 (“Grounds for optional non-execution of 
the European arrest warrant”) and Article 4a (“Decisions rendered following a trial at which 
the person did not appear in person”) set out the grounds for non-execution of a EAW. 
The Framework Decision doesn’t therefore contain any provisions on non-execution on the 
basis of a breach of the requested person's fundamental rights in the issuing Member State 
as detailed in the previous chapter. The mechanism is derived from case law and the larger 
legal framework and its meaning. The possibility to non-execute a EAW on this basis was 
nevertheless recognized in legal literature before case law existed on the matter.149 As 
established in the case law detailed in previous chapters, specifically Aranyosi and Căldăraru  
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and LM, the assessment on whether to refuse or allow the surrender of a person on the basis 
of risk to the right to the fair trial, should be examined as a two-step process. 
As a first step, the executing judicial authority must assess, on the basis of material that is 
objective, reliable, specific and properly updated concerning the operation of the system of 
justice in the issuing Member State, whether there is a real risk, connected with a lack of 
independence of the courts of that Member State on account of systemic or generalised 
deficiencies there, of the fundamental right to a fair trial being breached.150 
Then, if, having regard to the requirements noted, the executing judicial authority finds that 
there is, in the issuing Member State, a real risk of breach of the essence of the fundamental 
right to a fair trial on account of systemic or generalised deficiencies concerning the judiciary 
of that Member State, such as to compromise the independence of that State’s courts, that 
authority must, as a second step, assess specifically and precisely whether, in the particular 
circumstances of the case, there are substantial grounds for believing that, following his 
surrender to the issuing Member State, the requested person will run that risk.151 
This two-step test was first formulated in the judgment Aranyosi and Căldăraru, in the context 
of a surrender liable to result in a breach of Article 3 of the ECHR. The Court left a number of 
issues open, not least because the facts and circumstances of the case made it, according to 
Bárd - van Ballegooij, relatively easy one: a non-derogable right was at stake and its violation 
was established beyond doubt by ECtHR judgments. However, the ECJ left the question 
unanswered as to how national judicial authorities should proceed, where derogable rights 
are at stake and the pieces of evidence are less strong or persuasive. Neither did the ECJ 
address the issue of whether the newly adopted judicial test was applicable to rule of law 
violations beyond fundamental rights infringements and whether and under what conditions 
it should be up to the judicial branch to ensure proper rule of law and fundamental rights 
safeguards in judicial cooperation.152 
The same two-step test was then found applicable in LM in relation to Article 47 of the Charter, 
at least as far as the independence of the judiciary is concerned.153 In LM, the person 
concerned relied on a reasoned proposal adopted by the Commission pursuant to Article 7(1) 
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TEU in order for the Council to determine that there is a clear risk of a serious breach by that 
Member State of the values referred to in Article 2 TEU, such as that of the rule of law, on 
account, in particular, of actions impairing the independence of the national courts. The 
Commission was led to adopt its reasoned proposal stemming from concerns relating to the 
independence of judges to the separation of powers and therefore to the right to a fair trial. 
But can then the same two-step test in question be applied to right to a fair trial as a whole? 
The only reasonable answer is yes. Any other answer would be against the principles stated in 
the Framework Decision and judicial protection as a meta-norm. If the same test was not 
applicable to, for instance, situations where the overall fairness of the procedure was at 
danger, this could lead to severe infringements. Advocate General Tanchev also noted in his 
LM opinion that “a risk of breach of the right to a fair trial may exist in the issuing Member 
State even if it is not in breach of the rule of law”.154 Regrettably, Tanchev did not state his 
reasoning in detail for this opinion. CJEU has yet to give its irrefutable judgment on the matter, 
but any other answer would be illogical. 
On this basis, the test could be reformulated to apply to right to a fair trial as a whole. 
Advocate General Tanchev also provided his own two-step test in his opinion, excluding the 
mention of independence, but referring to “a flagrant denial of justice”.155 Removing the 
mention of independence from ECJ’s two-step test, to take the whole Article 47 of the Charter 
into consideration, would be worded as follows: 
(i) As a first step, the executing judicial authority must assess, on the basis of material that 
is objective, reliable, specific and properly updated concerning the operation of the 
system of justice in the issuing Member State, whether there is a real risk, on account of 
systemic or generalised deficiencies there, of the fundamental right to a fair trial being 
breached. 
(ii) Then as a second step, if, having regard to the requirements noted, the executing 
judicial authority finds that there is, in the issuing Member State, a real risk of breach of 
the essence of the fundamental right to a fair trial, that authority must, as a second step, 
assess specifically and precisely whether, in the particular circumstances of the case, there 
are substantial grounds for believing that, following his surrender to the issuing Member 
State, the requested person will run that risk. 
                                                          
154 C-216/18 LM EU:C:2018:517, AG Opinion, para. 40. See COM(2017) 835 final Proposal for a COUNCIL DECISION 
on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law, paras. 171-
186 of the explanatory memorandum to the Commission’s reasoned proposal. The Advocate General also 
underlined the fact that the two assessments conducted, respectively, by the Council and by the executing 
judicial authority, do not have the same objective. 
155 C-216/18 LM EU:C:2018:517, AG Opinion, para. 133. See also chapter 4.4.2. 
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Although LM can be seen as a landmark decision as it expressly allowed the use of breach of 
the right to a fair to act as a reason for EAW’s non-execution, some still view it as “a missed 
opportunity" and not as a breakthrough as it requires case-by-case approach rather than 
offering a systemic answer.156 It has even been argued that the whole question should be 
examined purely as a rule of law issue rather than a fair trial or human rights issue.157 However, 
Konstadinides has argued that compartmentalizing the problems in Poland and addressing 
specific EU law breaches through the lenses of fundamental rights, adds to the existing arsenal 
available to the EU Institutions under Article 258 TFEU and Article 7 TEU to enforce the rule of 
law in backsliding Member States.158 Further, by elevating effective judicial protection of 
individuals’ rights under EU law, referred to in Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of the Charter, 
the ECJ is effectively claiming ownership of the Charter. This solidifies its reputation as a 
fundamental rights court and further empowers individuals to defend common values which 
are gradually becoming uncommon in some Member States. 
Although the two-step test was introduced in Aranyosi and Căldăraru and then later found 
applicable in LM, these cases are different enough. As noted by Dorociak and Lewandowski, 
in LM the violation had not been yet stated by the CJEU or the ECtHR and therefore, the High 
Court in Ireland was not in an analogous situation to the Court in Germany in Aranyosi 159 
Difference between these two situations, refusal under Article 4 or Article 47, is also derived 
from the fundamentally different nature of these two rights. As noted also by Advocate 
General Bot, while the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment is absolute,160 the right 
to a fair trial set out in Article 47 may be subject to limitations.161 So even though the same 
test is applicable, the two situations are fundamentally different in this aspect. 
One important weakness of the LM judgments lies in the fact that the ECJ didn’t conduct the 
test itself, only ruling it applicable to the situation. The ECJ did not directly make a judgment 
on whether the systemic risk described would justify a refusal to surrender in this EAW case. 
According to Sadurski, this signals that the ECJ “strongly emphasized the huge obligations of 
the national court submitting the preliminary question.”162 Clearly, the ECJ didn’t want to 
                                                          
156 Pech — Wachowiec (2019). 
157 see Bárd — van Ballegooij (2018). 
158 Konstadinides (2019), p. 768-769. 
159 Dorociak — Lewandowski (2018), p. 869-871. 
160 C-404/15 and C-659/15 Aranyosi and Căldăraru  EU:C:2016:198, para. 85; C-182/15 Petruhhin  EU:C:2016:630, 
para. 56; C-578/16 C. K. and Others EU:C:2017:127, para. 59; C-353/16 MP EU:C:2018:276, para. 36. 
161 C-216/18 LM EU:C:2018:517, AG Opinion, para. 57 
162 Sadurski (2019), p. 207. 
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depart from Aranyosi and Căldăraru, but this might have made the LM judgment too general 
to find much practical use while at the same time being too specific to guarantee other 
fundamental rights. 
A landmark or not, one must surely agree, after reading the LM judgment and analyzing the 
prerequisites, that LM set strict contingencies for refusal to surrender on the basis of a risk to 
right to fair trial. These prerequisites can be divided into six categories: (1) a real risk of breach 
of the fundamental right to a fair trial; (2) systemic or generalised deficiencies; (3) the 
requested person’s personal situation; (4) nature of the offence for which the person is being 
prosecuted and the factual context that form the basis of the EAW; (5) information provided 
by the issuing Member State; and (6) substantial grounds for believing that that person will 
run such a risk if he is surrendered to that State.  
 
5.2. The First Step 
5.2.1. Objective, Reliable, Specific and Properly Updated Material 
Article 19 of the Framework Decision (“Hearing the person pending the decision”) explicitly 
states that the requested person shall be heard by a judicial authority, which is also an integral 
part of a fair judicial process. In addition, the executing judicial authority must make the 
surrender decision in question on the basis of material, such as that set out in a reasoned 
proposal of the European Commission adopted pursuant to Article 7(1) TEU. This can be 
considered to be the starting point for the executing judicial authority to compare its material 
to.  
According to ECJ, information in the reasoned proposal was particularly relevant for the 
purposes the assessment in LM, but the ECJ also spells out the need for the material to be 
“objective, reliable, specific and properly updated concerning the operation of the system of 
justice in the issuing Member State.”163 Therefore, a reasoned proposal, such as the one 
referred to in LM, is not the only option as long as the material can meet the mentioned 
criteria. It does not mean, however, that such material will necessarily meet the Aranyosi test, 
as noted by Sadurski.164 
                                                          
163 C-216/18 LM EU:C:2018:586. para. 61.  See, to that effect, C-404/15 and C-659/15 Aranyosi and Căldăraru 
EU:C:2016:198, para. 89. 
164 Sadurski (2019), p. 207. 
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In Aranyosi and Căldăraru, ECJ identified the material as, inter alia, judgments of international 
courts, such as judgments of the ECtHR, judgments of courts of the issuing Member State, and 
also decisions, reports and other documents produced by bodies of the Council of Europe or 
under the aegis of the UN.165 The same standard was repeated in ECJ’s 
Generalstaatsanwaltschaft judgment (published the same year as LM).”166 This demonstrates, 
according to Konstadinides, “synergy between different rule of law stakeholders, at all levels, 
and provides substantial resources for national judges called to conduct an individual 
assessment and a concrete inquiry prior to blocking the execution of an EAW.”167  
In Aranyosi, several ECtHR cases and a report of the European Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture (CPT) were submitted as evidence. The national court referred 
specially to Varga and others v. Hungary168 in which the ECtHR held that Hungary had 
placed the applicants in overcrowded prisons with living spaces that were too small. As to 
the report of the CPT, the national court referred to the CPT’s findings, based on visits 
between 2009 and 2013, that there are concrete indications that the detention conditions 
in Hungary didn’t meet the minimum norms laid down in international law. In Căldăraru, 
the national court based their assessment on several cases before the ECtHR in which that 
court held that Romania had placed the applicants in overcrowded correctional facilities, 
without providing sufficient heating or warm water for showers. In addition, the national 
court referred to the CPT’s conclusion, based on visits in June 2014, that correctional 
facilities in Romania are overcrowded. 
The specific assessment of the second step is also necessary where the issuing Member State 
has been the subject of a reasoned proposal adopted by the Commission pursuant to 
Article 7(1) TEU.169 Dorociak - Lewandowski made the statement regarding the reasoned 
proposal that that the justified opinion of the Commission is still nothing more than “an 
opinion”.170 They held that only Member States, acting through the Council or the European 
Council, could suspend the mutual trust in relation to another Member State and declare the 
violation of one of the values of the European Union. ECJ’s LM judgment, however, valued the 
                                                          
165 C-404/15 and C-659/15 Aranyosi and Căldăraru EU:C:2016:198, para. 89. 
166 C-220/18 ML, EU:C:2018:589, para. 45. The CJEU continues in paras. 47-48: “That was the view taken, first, by 
the ECtHR, which held that the new measures are not a dead letter and that instead they furnish an effective 
guarantee of the right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment. Second, the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe, in its decision of June 2017, welcomed the Hungarian authorities’ 
commitment to resolve the problem of prison overcrowding and noted that the measures already taken 
appeared to have produced their first results and that it was to be hoped that those measures, and others that 
might be adopted in the future, might help the Hungarian authorities in taking, on a case-by-case basis, concrete 
and effective actions to further tackle that problem.” 
167 Konstadinides (2019), p. 752. Although incorrectly referred by Konstadinides as an “addition” to the first limb 
of the Aranyosi and Căldăraru test. The same wording was used in Aranyosa and Căldăraru. 
168 Varga and others v. Hungary (10 March 2015). 
169 C-216/18 LM EU:C:2018:586, para. 69. 
170 Dorociak — Lewandowski (2018) p. 869-871. It is to be noted that Dorociak — Lewandowski made their 
assessment before LM judgment’s publication. 
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reasoned proposal as “particularly relevant”. As the ECJ stated that such a document is to be 
viewed as particularly relevant, it must, before further review, be so.  
According to the ECJ, it is only if the European Council were to adopt a decision determining, 
as provided for in Article 7(2) TEU, that there is a serious and persistent breach in the issuing 
Member State of the principles set out in Article 2 TEU, such as those inherent in the rule of 
law, and the Council were then to suspend the Framework Decision in respect of that Member 
State that the executing judicial authority would be required to refuse automatically to 
execute any EAW issued by it.171 This would then, according to ECJ, happen without having to 
carry out any specific assessment of whether the individual concerned runs a real risk that the 
essence of his fundamental right to a fair trial will be affected. ECJ thus left the national courts 
the possibility to assess the significance of a reasoned proposal, while still leaving room for 
future developments. 
Regarding previous case law, Advocate General Sharpston in her Radu opinion noted that 
while the record of the Member States in complying with their human rights obligations may 
be commendable, it is also not pristine (as evidenced by the Commission’s 2011 report on 
EAW).172 According to Sharpston, there can therefore be no assumption that, simply because 
the surrender is requested by another Member State, that the person’s human rights will 
automatically be guaranteed on his arrival there. There can, however, be a presumption of 
compliance which is rebuttable only on the clearest possible evidence. Such evidence must be 
specific; propositions of a general nature, however well supported, will not suffice.173 This 
view expresses the principle of mutual trust setting a high standard of proof.174 
ECJ practically expanded the catalogue of sources of information to be considered by a judge 
in making determinations about an EAW by allowing any material that meets the standard set. 
However, there is always a need for a national court to assess the impact of such risk for 
individuals subject to an EAW.175 In this way, according to Sadurski, the ECJ simply evaded the 
issue of the systemic nature of threats to the rule of law signalled by the initiation of the Article 
                                                          
171 C-216/18 LM EU:C:2018:586, para. 72. 
172 COM(2011) 175 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
implementation since 2007 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant 
and the surrender procedures between Member States. 
173 C-396/11 Radu EU:C:2012:648, AG Opinion, para. 41. 
174 See chapter 7. 
175 See chapter 5.2.2. 
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7 procedure, which may render “time-consuming and convoluted” judicial tests 
unnecessary.176 
 
5.2.2. Real Risk of a Breach 
The existence of a real risk that the person in respect of whom a EAW has been issued will, if 
surrendered to the issuing judicial authority, suffer a breach of the essence of the person’s 
fundamental right to a fair trial,177 is capable of permitting the executing judicial authority to 
refrain, by way of exception, from giving effect to that EAW, on the basis of Article 1(3) of the 
Framework Decision.178  
The submitted material needs to go beyond than proving just a “risk”. “Real risk” carries the 
connotation of high probability. If the risk may occur, it should be considered as real. On other 
hand, if the risk just might occur, it can’t be considered real. So, for a risk to be considered 
real, the probability at which it may occur, should be at least over 50 percent. “Real risk” can 
be read as setting very strict criteria, but it shouldn’t be considering too restricting. If the risk 
to the essence of the fundamental right of fair trial may occur with over 50 percent probability, 
this should be enough. Due weight should be given to ensuring judicial protection. 
This requirement could otherwise put the individual at a significant disadvantage as the 
burden of proof is already set quite high. Regarding the burden of proof, Advocate General 
Tanchev’s LM opinion stated that the individual concerned should be the one required to 
establish that there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of suffering a 
flagrant denial of justice in the issuing Member State.179 Such a position corresponds to the 
position of the ECtHR, which holds, in addition, that, once such evidence has been adduced, it 
is for the State in question to dispel any doubts in that regard.180 
The LM judgment was in line with the Advocate General’s opinion in Radu, where the 
Advocate General was of the opinion that “something more than mere suggestions of 
                                                          
176 Sadurski (2019), p. 207. 
177 See chapter 2.3. 
178 C-216/18 LM EU:C:2018:586, para. 59. 
179 C-216/18 LM EU:C:2018:517, AG Opinion, para. 115. See Ahorugeze v. Sweden (27 October 2011), para. 116; 
Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom( (17 January 2012), para. 261; and Yefimova v. Russia (19 February 
2013), para. 220. 
180 See chapter 5.3.2. 
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potential impropriety will be needed”.181  If the executing court is not to implement a EAW on 
the basis that there is a real risk that the requested person’s rights will be infringed, it will not 
be sufficient that rudimentary doubts are raised. The Advocate General suggested that the 
appropriate test is that the requested person must persuade the decision-maker that his 
objections to the transfer are substantially well founded. 
Even if requesting Member State’s courts were to provide safe-guards in a single case, actual 
use of these in practice by a compromised judiciary, is perhaps not that likely. Konstadinides 
has expressed the need to consider that although essence of fundamental right to a fair trial 
may be compromised in a Member State, the judiciary is not a monolithic sector.182 Meaning 
that despite Member State’s systemic reforms, that Member State may still have courts that 
are able to provide a fair trial. Executing judges need to be careful in their assessment not to 
be prejudiced against an individual Member State in all situations and to remember the 
importance of mutual trust183 or “high level of confidence between Member States” as 
expressed by Recital 10 of the Framework Decision (“…implementation of the [EAW] 
mechanism may be suspended only in the event of a serious and persistent breach by one of 
the Member States of the principles set out in Article 2 TEU, determined by the European 
Council pursuant to Article 7(2) TEU, with the consequences set out in Article 7(3) TEU…”). 
As noted by Advocate General Tanchev in his LM, determination by the Council that there is a 
clear risk of a serious breach of the values referred to in Article 2 TEU does not have the same 
consequences as the executing judicial authority finding that there is a real risk of breach of a 
fundamental right.184 A suggested proposal therefore leaves the rule of law situation in a sort 
of a limbo: Article 7(1) TEU does not prescribe the period within which the Council, when it 
has a reasoned proposal before it, must adopt a decision determining that there is a clear risk 
of a serious breach of the values referred to in Article 2 TEU, but it also does not provide that, 
if the Council considers that there is no such risk, it is to adopt a decision to that effect.185 
 
                                                          
181 C-396/11 Radu EU:C:2012:648, AG Opinion, para. 85. 
182 Konstadinides (2019), p. 754-755. 
183 See chapter 7. 
184 C-216/18 LM EU:C:2018:517, AG Opinion, para. 41. 
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5.2.3. Systemic or Generalised Deficiencies 
The decision to non-execute a EAW must be made on account of systemic or generalised 
deficiencies (“systemic or, at all events, generalised deficiencies”186). The importance of 
systemic or generalized deficiencies should be analyzed in relation to the effect they would 
have on the surrendered person’s trial. The executing judicial authority must, in particular, 
examine to what extent the systemic or generalised deficiencies are liable to have an impact 
at the level of that State’s courts with jurisdiction over the proceedings to which the requested 
person will be subject.187 This connects the deficiencies to the real risk criteria described in 
the previous chapter. If the deficiencies do not have an effect on the trial process of the person 
concerned, ECJ’s criteria is not met. 
Judicial independence is an important aspect of the judiciary system as a whole which, when 
compromised, can prove to be a deficiency described. In Associação Sindical dos Juízes 
Portugueses, ECJ ruled that principle of judicial independence doesn’t preclude general salary-
reduction measures, linked to requirements to eliminate an excessive budget deficit and to an 
EU financial assistance programme, from being applied to the members of the Court of 
Auditors of Portugal.188 
Konstadinides has expressed that LM indicates ECJ’s acute awareness of its boundaries in 
finding systemic or generalized deficiencies in the Member States.189 Konstadinides suspected 
that ECJ knows that the LM case raised primarily a problem of rule of law in Poland, but ECJ 
still understands that it has been asked a different question by the referring court. 
What then is the relationship between systemic or generalized deficiencies and Article 7 TEU? 
Although “systemic or generalized deficiencies” are different from “a clear and serious 
breach”, at least some overlap between the two concepts exists. Article 7 TEU is not, however, 
by design a remedy for individual breaches in specific situations, Larion has described it as a 
solution of last-resort, a concerted action that exists for “systemic problems, that raise to a 
certain threshold of seriousness and persistence.”190 They still examine similar situations, 
although their aims are different. 
                                                          
186 C-216/18 LM EU:C:2018:586, para. 60. 
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Commission of the European Communities expressed in their communication on Article 7 TEU 
to the Council and the European Parliament that a risk of serious breach must be “clear”, 
excluding purely contingent risks from the scope of the prevention mechanism.191 The serious 
breach criterion is common to the prevention and the penalty mechanisms: the clear risk must 
be that of a “serious” breach and the breach itself when it occurs must be “serious”. To 
determine the seriousness of the breach, a variety of criteria will have to be considered, inter 
alia, the purpose and the result of the breach.192 Persistent breach applies only to the 
activation of the penalty mechanism in respect of a breach which has already taken place. For 
breach to be persistent, it must last some time, but persistence can be expressed in a variety 
of manners.193 
Examining these criteria is tightly connected to the real risk of a breach. Artice 7 TEU is 
considered through clear risk (excluding purely contingent risks) + serious breach (eg. purpose 
and the result of the breach) and the systemic or generalized deficiencies of Aranyosi test in 
LM through the effect they would have on the surrendered person’s trial (in particular, to 
what extent the systemic or generalised deficiencies are liable to have an impact at the level 
of that State’s courts with jurisdiction over the proceedings to which the requested person 
will be subject).  
Even if a 1:1 correlation between the two concepts doesn’t exist, at least a strong correlation 
does. Systemic or generalised deficiencies can exist even if a serious and persistent breach to 
rule of law does not. The threshold for systemic or generalised deficiencies should not be 
interpreted as too limiting, but rather from the perspective of judicial protection. 
The systemic or generalized deficiencies mentioned could also be expressed as “deficiencies 
affecting a majority of the requesting Member State’s operation of the system of justice”. If 
the examination shows that the deficiencies are liable to affect national courts, the executing 
judicial authority must also conduct the second step of the described test. 
                                                          
191 COM(2003) 606 final Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on 
Article 7 of the Treaty on the European Union. Respect for and promotion of the values on which the Union is 
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5.3. The Second Step 
5.3.1. Proportionality 
The assessment must be made, having regard to the requested person’s personal situation, as 
well as to the nature of the offence for which he is being prosecuted and the factual context 
that form the basis of the EAW.194 These three (the requested person’s personal situation, the 
nature of the offence and the factual context) form the “proportionality” aspect of the two-
step assessment. Although ECH did not use the term in their ruling, in practice, it holds the 
same meaning. The case law, LM or others indirectly related, do not give much information 
on how to judge the personal situation of the persons concerned. 
ECJ’s general vagueness concerning this aspect leaves much room for future developments. It 
seems reasonable, however, to make an overall assessment and to balance all three in order 
to achieve a reasonable outcome. In LM, the person requested provided the Irish Court 
evidence as to comments made by the the Deputy Minister of Justice which raised certain 
concerns. Those comments, in particular by “virtue of their repetitive nature, their reference 
to the respondent as a criminal, and most importantly, the statement that he is wanted for 
punishment, would all appear to have considerable implications for his presumption of 
innocence.”195 The Irish Court did find these comments, even when taken in the context of the 
deficiencies relating to the independence of the judiciary in Poland, to give rise to a real risk 
that the respondent would face a flagrant denial of his right to a fair trial on his surrender to 
Poland.196 
Regarding Article 6(1) of the ECHR, the Advocate General in LM provided the example of 
Ahorugeze v. Sweden, in which the ECtHR held that the extradition of the applicant, a Rwandan 
national of Hutu ethnicity, to Rwanda, where he was to stand trial on charges of genocide and 
crimes against humanity, would not expose him to a real risk of flagrant denial of justice.197 
Among other factors, the ECtHR examined the applicant’s personal situation. It found that 
neither the fact that the applicant had given testimony for the defence before the 
                                                          
194 C-216/18 LM EU:C:2018:586, para. 75. In LM, the three EAWs’ against the person concerned were, inter alia, 
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195 Minister for Justice and Equality v. Celmer (no.4) [2018] IEHC 484, para. 36. 
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International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, nor the fact that he had been head of the 
Rwandan Civil Aviation Authority, nor his conviction for destroying other people’s property 
during the 1994 genocide exposed him to a flagrant denial of justice.  
Disproportionate use of the EAW is currently problematic on a systematic level as the current 
absence of any parallel system for enabling less serious trans-border crime to be dealt with by 
less drastic tools means that prosecutors are tempted to use EAWs heavy-handedly.198 For 
example, the UK and the Netherlands have allegedly been overloaded by cases of chicken and 
bicycle thefts and other petty crimes by the Polish authorities: the overuse of EAW is 
confirmed to be a general issue, a serious enough to affect the enforcement of the EAW in 
many countries.199 Proportionality principle is also important for maintaining mutual trust 
between Member States.200 
What allows proportionality to be considered, is the nature of the right to fair trial as 
derogable. ECJ’s LM wording expresses the idea put forth in Advocate General’s Aranyosi 
opinion that it is necessary to “weigh up the rights of the surrendered person against the 
requirements of the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”201 Article 6 of the 
Charter states that everyone has the right not only to liberty but also to security of 
person. That right, as the right guaranteed in Article 4 of the Charter is an absolute, non-
derogable right. Where the person, with respect to whom the EAW is issued, is sought for acts 
of terrorism or rape of a child, the non-execution of the EAW raises the question of the need 
to “safeguard national security and public order.”202 It is necessary to bear in mind that the 
interests of the victims of crimes in seeing their perpetrators brought to justice are also at 
stake.203 
The Framework Decision provides no binding proportionality test for EAWs. However, 
Commission’s EAW Handbook gives its soft law version. According to the Handbook, 
particularly the following factors could be taken into account: (a) the seriousness of the 
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203 C-396/11 Radu EU:C:2012:648, AG Opinion, para. 81. 
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offence; (b) the likely penalty imposed if the person is found guilty of the alleged offence; (c) 
the likelihood of detention of the person in the issuing Member State after surrender; (d) the 
interests of the victims of the offence. Issuing judicial authorities should also consider whether 
other judicial cooperation measures could be used instead of issuing a EAW.204  
The proportionality test of Article 52(1) (“Scope of guaranteed right”) of the Charter is a 
threefold one and implies an assessment of the measure in terms of its suitability, necessity 
and proportionality stricto sensu. The suitability test evaluates appropriateness of the means 
(the restriction) in relation to the achievement of the objective pursued. According to 
Mancano, the necessity test implies that the measure chosen is the least intrusive measure 
for the right or freedom restricted, on condition of being equally effective to meet that 
objective: proportionality will be complied with if the means adopted does not impose “an 
excessive burden on the right.”205  
 
5.3.2. Dialogue Between National Courts 
The executing authority must, after finding general or systemic deficiencies in the protections 
provided in the issuing Member State, seek all necessary supplementary information from the 
issuing Member State’s judicial authority as to the protections for the individual concerned.206 
In the course of such a “dialogue” between the executing judicial authority and the issuing 
judicial authority, the latter may, where appropriate, provide the executing judicial authority 
with any objective material on any changes concerning the conditions for protecting the 
guarantee of judicial independence in the issuing Member State.207  
This emphasis on “dialogue” can be viewed as the ECJ’s way of furthering mutual trust when 
it’s at risk. However, as Bárd & van Ballegooij note, ECJ’s insistence that the executing 
authority acquire supplementary information from the issuing judicial authority and that the 
two courts should engage in a dialogue requires that a court will admit its own shortcomings 
(in LM, presumed lack of independence), but such a self-criticism is unlikely, because the 
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issuing court would destroy its own reputation.208  In the case of lack of independence, the 
issuing court would also then be criticizing the issuing state’s executive, the very branch of 
government upon which it is dependent. 
Sadurski has observed some practical problems with ECJ’s current policy.209 For one, when 
reliable information is needed fast from one Member State, how is a national in another 
Member State supposed manage this, especially when the supplementary information should 
also be objective, reliable, specific and properly updated. Secondly, as Sadurski noted, in this 
kind of a situation the requesting Member State’s judicial needs to enjoy significant 
independence. The requirement for such action is self-defeating otherwise. 
The material provided is considered only supplementary. In accordance with Article 15(2) of 
the Framework Decision, the executing judicial authority may fix a time limit for the receipt of 
the information requested. That time limit must be adjusted to the particular case, so as to 
allow to that authority the time required to collect the information, if necessary by seeking 
assistance to that end from the central authority or one of the central authorities of the issuing 
Member State, under Article 7 of the Framework Decision. 
There appears to be stricter conditions set in LM ruling than the Framework Decisions Article 
15(3). In accordance with Article 15(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584 the issuing judicial 
authority may at any time forward any additional useful information to the executing judicial 
authority.210 However, according to LM ruling, the issuing judicial authority is obliged to 
provide that information to the executing judicial authority.211 Considering ECJ’s wording, it 
seems that the executing judicial authority is required the material if it wants to have the EAW 
executed. 
 
5.3.3. Substantial Grounds 
The refusal to surrender a person requires that there are substantial grounds for believing 
that that person will run the risk described if he is surrendered to the requesting Member 
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State. “Substantial grounds” can be regarded as an overall assessment of all the previous 
criteria. If objective, reliable, specific and properly updated material, a real of risk of a breach, 
systemic or generalized deficiencies, proportionality and dialogue between national courts all 
show substantial reasons that the person requested should not be surrendered, then the 
executing judicial authority should refuse the EAW.  
However, a decision by the Council completely removes the need for the two-step test. 
According to the ECJ, “as long as a decision, described in Article 7 TEU, has not been adopted 
by the Council, the executing judicial authority may refrain--”.212 The Council’s decision 
therefore overrides the need for any individualized review and serves as substantial grounds 
by itself. 
The repeated emphases on ”exceptional” circumstances as to when such a suspension of trust 
allowed raises a very high bar before a national judge who is concerned about the state of a 
system of justice. This practically guarantees that suspension in individual situations will be 
extremely rare, if they occur at all.213 
As regards the standard of proof, the Advocate General in Radu noted that it should not be 
required to prove a potential breach be established “beyond reasonable doubt”. Such a 
standard may be appropriate, and is used in certain jurisdictions, in determining the obligation 
to be imposed on the prosecution services in criminal trials but the Advocate General did not 
find it appropriate here. Furthermore, there is a risk that the obligation it imposes on the 
person concerned, who may be in need of legal aid, will be impossible in practice to satisfy.214 
Advocate General in Radu also expressed that in cases involving Articles 5 and 6 of the 
Convention and/or Articles 6, 47 and 48 of the Charter that the infringement must be such as 
fundamentally to destroy the fairness of the process. The person alleging infringement must 
persuade the decision-maker that his objections are substantially well founded. Past 
infringements that are capable of remedy will not found such an objection.215 In the context 
of a past infringement, it must be demonstrated either that their effect, if spent, will of itself 
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be such that no fair trial can be possible or that their past effects, if continuing will be such 
that they will have the same result.216 
Overall, observance of the rights of the person whose surrender is requested falls primarily 
within the responsibility of the issuing Member State, which must be presumed to be 
compliant with EU law, in particular the fundamental rights conferred by that law.217 However, 
because of the lack a global legal framework for guaranteeing the right to a fair trial, it is up 
to all the courts, national and international, to be alert to this risk. According to Gless, the right 
to a fair trial must be established as a general principle with implications for the understanding 
of criminal investigations and prosecutions not limited to national criminal justice systems.218 
Looking at the two-step assessment through the individual’s need for judicial protection is 
therefore useful for not setting the standard of proof too high a standard. Rather, emphasizing 
fundamental rights, such as Article 47, as the most important underlying principle when 
substantial grounds exist, allows the two-step to remain reasonable. 
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6. Strasbourg Court’s Interpretation 
6.1. ECtHR’s Relationship with the CJEU 
What then is the difference between the CJEU’s interpretation of the Charter’s Article 47 and 
the ECtHR’s interpretation of Article 6 in EAW cases? CJEU has acknowledged ECtHR’s 
judgments among legal sources for national courts to consider when conducting the two-step 
test. However, for some time, the CJEU wanted to take a very narrow view and had not taken 
the opportunity to clarify the relationship between the EAW, the ECHR and the Charter. ECJ 
gives great weight to the need to have an efficient surrender mechanism between Member 
States when examining EAW cases and this has led some to question whether sufficient 
prominence is given to the role of the ECtHR in providing enough protection against ECHR 
violations.219 
Advocate General Sharpston tried pinpoint the distinction between the two systems in her 
French Republic v People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran opinion. As Sharpston noted, the 
TEU represents a self-standing set of rules, that has been termed an “autonomous legal 
system”. In interpreting that legal order, the CJEU has, it is true, drawn “inspiration from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States” for the purposes of defining the 
fundamental rights which form an integral part of the general principles of the legal order of 
the EU. All the Member States are also signatory to the ECHR and is therefore bound to apply 
its rules. But to conclude that national systems for the protection of fundamental rights and 
the EU equivalent are, therefore, one and the same thing seems simply misconceived.220 
CJEU seems to heavily rely on ECtHR’s ruling in open questions as exemplified by Dumitru-
Tudor Dorobantu in which the ECJ ruled that: “As regards, in particular, the personal space 
available to each detainee, the executing judicial authority must, in the absence, currently, of 
minimum standards in that respect under EU law, take account of the minimum requirements 
under Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, signed at Rome on 4 November 1950, as interpreted by the European Court of 
Human Rights.”221 
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The CJEU seems to have embarked on the path to becoming a human rights court. However, 
Weiß noted that the CJEU, at the same time, still might be tempted, based on the autonomy 
of EU law and the continuity side of the EU post-Lisbon human rights regime, to continue 
traditional interpretive approaches, which counter effective human rights protection with 
structural characteristics of the EU in order to limit the enjoyment of EU human rights.222 
Considering the case law of the CJEU, it is necessary to bear in mind that Article 52(3) of the 
Charter provides that it is open to EU law to provide more extensive protection than that laid 
down by the ECHR.223 The executing Member State should only exceptionally refuse to 
transfer a requested person under the Framework Decision. The whole objective of the 
Framework Decision would be undermined if it were possible to raise what might be described 
as “routine” challenges based on “notional breaches of human rights.”224 
 
6.2. Essential Case Law 
6.2.1. Soering v. United Kingdom 
Soering v. United Kingdom (07 July 1989) is a landmark judgment of the ECtHR which 
established that extradition of a young German national to the United States to face charges 
of capital murder violated Article 3 of the ECHR guaranteeing the right against inhuman and 
degrading treatment. It enlarged the scope of a state's responsibility for breaches of the ECHR. 
A signatory State must consider consequences of returning an individual to a third country 
where that individual might face treatment that breaches the ECHR. This is notwithstanding 
that the ill-treatment may be beyond its control225, or even that general assurances have been 
provided that no ill-treatment will take place.226 
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The ECtHR concluded in the judgment that having regard to the very long period of time spent 
on death row in such extreme conditions, with the ever present and mounting anguish of 
awaiting execution of the death penalty, and to the personal circumstances of the applicant, 
especially his age and mental state at the time of the offence, the applicant’s extradition to 
the United States would expose him to a real risk of treatment going beyond the threshold set 
by Article 3 of the ECHR. A further consideration of relevance is that in the particular instance 
the legitimate purpose of extradition could be achieved by another means which would not 
involve suffering of such exceptional intensity or duration.227 
Importantly, the ECtHR did not exclude that an issue might exceptionally be raised under 
Article 6 by an extradition decision in circumstances where the fugitive has suffered or risks 
suffering a flagrant denial of a fair trial in the requesting country. However, the facts of the 
Soering case did not disclose such a risk.228 
 
6.2.2. Pirozzi v. Belgium 
Pirozzi v. Belgium (17 April 2018)229 concerned Mr. Pirozzi’s detention by the Belgian 
authorities and his surrender to the Italian authorities under a EAW with a view to enforcing 
a criminal conviction imposing 14 years’ imprisonment for drug trafficking. With regard to the 
lawfulness and propriety of the EAW, in line with the system established by the Framework 
Decision, it was for the judicial authority which had issued the EAW and to which Pirozzi ought 
to be handed over to assess the lawfulness and validity of the EAW. The Belgian public 
prosecutor’s office did not therefore have discretion to assess the appropriateness of the 
arrest, and the Belgian courts could have refused to execute it only on the grounds set out in 
the Belgian legislation. In this connection, the ECtHR considered that the review carried out 
by the Belgian authorities, thus limited, did not in itself give rise to any problem in relation to 
the ECHR, provided that the Belgian courts examined the merits of the complaints raised 
under the ECHR. In the case, they had verified that the enforcement of the EAW in Pirozzi’s 
case did not give rise to manifestly deficient protection of the rights guaranteed by the ECHR. 
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With regard to Pirozzi’s conviction in absentia, Pirozzi had been officially informed of the date 
and place of the hearing and he had been assisted and defended by a lawyer whom he had 
himself appointed. In addition, that defence had been effective, in that it had obtained a 
reduction in his sentence. 
The ECtHR noted that the implementation of the EAW by the Belgian courts had not been 
manifestly deficient such that it rebutted the presumption of equivalent protection afforded 
both by the EAW system – as defined by the Framework Decision and clarified by the case law 
of the CJEU – and by its application in Belgian law. The ECtHR also concluded that Pirozzi’s 
surrender to the Italian authorities could not be considered as having been based on a trial 
amounting to a flagrant denial of justice. the ECtHR considered that Pirozzi’s surrender to the 
Italian authorities had not been in breach of Article 6 § 1 of the ECHR. 
 
6.3. Flagrant Denial of Justice 
As demonstrated above, according to the ECtHR’s case law, an issue might exceptionally arise 
under Article 6 by an extradition decision in circumstances where the individual would risk 
suffering a flagrant denial of a fair trial in the requesting country. The principle was first set 
out in Soering230 and has been subsequently confirmed by the ECtHR in a number of cases.231 
The term “flagrant denial of justice” has been considered synonymous with a trial which is 
manifestly contrary to the ECHR’s Article 6 or the principles embodied therein.232 
According to the ECtHR, a flagrant denial of justice goes beyond mere irregularities or lack of 
safeguards in the trial procedures such as might result in a breach of Article 6 of the ECHR if 
occurring within the Contracting State itself. What is required is a breach of the principles of 
fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 of the ECHR which is so fundamental as to amount to a 
nullification, or destruction of the very essence, of the right guaranteed by that Article.233 
Doobasy has noted that the ECtHR continues to consider the different criminal justice systems 
of the parties to the ECHR trying to ensure that the ECHR is applied and differences in national 
systems are respected. While many claimants raise detailed allegations about specific 
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provisions of ECHR’s Article 6, the ECtHR tends to take a more holistic view and to consider 
the overall fairness of the proceedings taking into account the interests of other parties to the 
process.234 
It is clear that the test for a refusal in surrender cases must be a rigorous one. In Radu, the 
Advocate General took issue, with the case law of the ECtHR in two aspects. Firstly, the term 
“flagrant” which appears to be too nebulous to be interpreted consistently throughout the 
Member States. The breach must be so fundamental as to amount to a complete denial or 
nullification of the right to a fair trial.235 Secondly, the Advocate General viewed the test as 
“unduly stringent”. It would require that every aspect of the trial process be unfair. However, 
a trial that is only partly fair cannot be guaranteed to ensure that justice is done. The 
appropriate criterion should rather be that the deficiency or deficiencies in the trial process 
should be such as fundamentally to destroy its fairness.236 
The first aspect seems a common problem in practically all legal interpretation conducted by 
multiple parties. The second aspect, however, seems based on a slight misinterpretation by 
the Advocate General: the requires a breach of the principles of fair trial which is so 
fundamental as to amount to a nullification, or destruction of the very essence, of the right.237 
Destruction of the right’s essence does not require the whole process (meaning every step) to 
be unfair.238 The two criteria currently utilized are then not so different. Gáspár-Szilágyi even 
questioned whether the CJEU decided in Aranyosi to end “the frosty relationship” between it 
and the ECtHR by moulding its own standard of fundamental rights protection to better fit the 
standards used by the ECtHR.239 
The Advocate General in Radu also found non-remediable and remediable breaches to hold 
different weight. Breaches that are remediable will not, in the Advocate General’s view, justify 
a refusal to transfer the requested person to the “offending” Member State. Such breaches 
cannot prevail over the objectives of the swift and efficient administration of justice which the 
Framework Decision seeks to promote. The ECtHR has repeatedly held that, when considering 
whether a breach of Article 6 of the ECHR has been established, it is necessary to ascertain 
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whether the proceedings, considered as a whole were fair. Naturally, nothing would prevent 
the person in question from seeking to recover damages in respect of the infringement, under 
the relevant principles of EU or national law or, if appropriate, Article 41 of the ECHR (“Just 
satisfaction”).240  
One of the key differences the two interpretations is the existence of mutual trust.241 CJEU 
has to consider it while ECtHR does not. As Mitsilegas puts it, mutual trust “represents a 
fundamental philosophical and substantive difference in the protection of fundamental rights 
between the Luxembourg and Strasbourg Courts.”242 However, ECtHR has moulded something 
similar: the Bosphorus doctrine.243 
Also know as the presumption of equivalent protection, the Bosphorus principle applies when 
the mutual recognition mechanisms require a national court to presume that the observance 
of fundamental rights by another Member State has been sufficient. The national court is thus 
deprived of its discretion in the matter, leading to automatic application of 
the Bosphorus presumption of equivalence. The ECtHR has emphasized that this results, 
paradoxically, in a twofold limitation of the national court’s review of the observance of 
fundamental rights, due to the combined effect of the presumption on which mutual 
recognition is founded and the Bosphorus presumption of equivalent protection.244 
The ruling in Bosphorus then ensures that the protection provided by the ECHR remains in 
place even when the contested act can be ascribed to the EU rather than to its Member State; 
however, Spaventa has rather wisely drawn attention to the fact that Bosphorus only provides 
protection against noteworthy deficiencies in the protection, since: 1) it establishes a 
presumption of equivalent protection of EU law with the ECHR, 2) it is for the claimant to 
prove that such equivalent protection is not only lacking but manifestly deficient.245  
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7. Mutual Trust and the Surrender Decision 
7.1. Mutual Trust as a Principle 
7.1.1. Mutual Trust… 
Defining mutual trust has taken place largely in CJEU’s case law. Two general principles have 
become clear. Firstly, both the principle of mutual trust between the Member States and the 
principle of mutual recognition, which is itself based on the mutual trust between the latter, 
are of fundamental importance in EU law given that they allow an area without internal 
borders to be created and maintained. Secondly and more specifically, the principle of mutual 
trust requires, particularly as regards the area of freedom, security and justice, each of those 
Member States, save in exceptional circumstances, to consider all the other Member States 
to be complying with EU law and particularly with the fundamental rights recognised by EU 
law.246 
The fundamental assumption is that each Member State shares with all the other Member 
States, and recognises that they share with it, a set of common values on which the EU is 
founded, as stated in Article 2 TEU (among those rule of law). That assumption implies and 
justifies the existence of mutual trust between the Member States that those values will be 
recognised and, therefore, that the law of the EU that implements them will be respected.247 
However, ECJ has also stated that the observance of the rights of the person whose surrender 
is requested falls primarily within the responsibility of the issuing Member State, because of 
mutual trust.248 These two seem paradoxical on a surface level. 
CJEU has previously given mutual trust importance even over fundamental rights. Concerning 
the Union’s accession to the ECHR, the CJEU stated: “When implementing EU law, the Member 
States may, under EU law, be required to presume that fundamental rights have been 
observed by the other Member States, so that not only may they not demand a higher level 
of national protection of fundamental rights from another Member State than that provided 
by EU law, but, save in exceptional cases, they may not check whether that other Member 
State has actually, in a specific case, observed the fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
                                                          
246 C-216/18 LM EU:C:2018:586, para. 36. 
247 See Opinion 2/13 (Accession of the European Union to the ECHR) of 18 December 2014 EU:C:2014:2454, 
para. 168 
248 See C-367/16 Piotrowski EU:C:2018:27, para. 50 and C-551/18 IK EU:C:2018:991, para. 66) 
60 
 
 
 
EU.”249 This approach seems to have evolved from a natural assumption that rule of law is 
followed across the EU and is consistent with the most recent case law, but it certainly poses 
practical problems resulting from blind spots in the EAW process.250 
 
7.1.2. …but Verify 
Mutual trust is founded on the premise that the criminal courts of the other Member States 
meet the requirements of effective judicial protection because, following execution of a EAW, 
the courts will have to conduct the criminal procedure for the purpose of prosecution, or of 
enforcement of a custodial sentence or detention order, and the substantive criminal 
proceedings.251 As Roeben has argued, judicial protection252 can override even  mutual 
trust.253 The relationship of mutual trust and judicial protection is, therefore, a strained one.254 
One of the most important consequences arising from Aranyosi is, according to Caeiro –  
Finaldo – Prata Rodrigues, the pressure that is now put on Member States to make their prison 
system comply, in the actual practice, with human rights standards.255 Not complying, the 
Member States face the risk of having their requests for judicial cooperation systematically 
denied across the whole EU. In Caeiro –  Finaldo – Prata Rodrigues’s view, eventually nothing 
reinforces mutual trust more than ruling that mutual trust is not a mere normative 
assumption: it must be earned and deserved (although seemingly paradoxical). This same logic 
is easily applied to fair trial threats. If rule of law and fair trial erode, Member States can risk 
losing the advantages that mutual trust provides: low-effort judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters. 
Additionally, Member States have to make sure that they offer remedies to redress possible 
breaches of fundamental rights that are equivalent to remedies available when implementing 
national law: EU law must be interpreted as meaning that a national court is bound to take 
into consideration the whole body of rules of national law and to interpret them, so far as 
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possible, in accordance with the Framework Decision, in order to achieve the result sought by 
the Framework Decision, and if necessary to disapply, on its own authority, the interpretation 
adopted by the national court of last resort, if that interpretation is not compatible with EU 
law.256  
Within the EAW system, the existing legal framework prevents the need to verify, in every 
single surrender case, the level of protection and the respect of fundamental rights. The area 
of freedom, security and justice can only function efficiently if it is not necessary to verify, in 
every concrete case, whether values, in particular fundamental rights, are actually 
guaranteed. However, in a concrete case, in Prechal’s words: “the delicate balance, -- between 
preserving the system, on the one hand, and offering sufficient protection to fundamental 
rights, on the other, must be kept in mind.”257 The protection of fundamental rights should 
not therefore be examined in every case, but still kept in mind in case suspicions of breaches 
arise. 
 
7.2. Suspending Mutual Trust 
In practice, mutual trust is not always guaranteed between EU judicial authorities, despite the 
existence of EU fundamental rights and of mechanisms to remedy a possible violation. 
Marguery has asked, does any failure generate a loss of mutual trust?258 The answer is, 
considering everything already said, of course not. However, an accumulation of small failures 
can lead to a failed system. Even ECJ implied as much in their LM ruling when referring to 
“systemic or, at all events, generalised deficiencies”259. When can a judicial authority then set 
aside its obligation of mutual recognition and mutual trust?  
According to Arnull, the general principle of respect for fundamental rights enjoys the same 
formal status as other general principles (in theory).260 As early as 2012, Billing drew attention 
to mutual trust as a rebuttable principle. A conclusive presumption, that the issuing Member 
State will respect a requested person’s fundamental and human rights, should be prohibited. 
The presumption of mutual trust must be viewed as derogable. It is necessary to ensure from 
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a legal point of view that national implementing legislation promotes both the issuing and the 
executing Member States’ duties to interpret and apply the Framework Decision in a manner 
which is consistent with the Charter, the ECHR and general principles of EU law.261  
A surprisingly large emphasis has been given to mutual trust in CJEU’s case law and legal 
literature considering that fundamental rights are at the other end of the scale. Melloni 
judgment exemplifies this.262 ECJ stated in that judgment that allowing a Member State to 
avail itself of Article 53 of the Charter to make the surrender of a person convicted in absentia 
conditional upon the conviction being open to review in the issuing Member State, a 
possibility not provided for under Framework Decision, in order to avoid an adverse effect on 
the right to a fair trial and the rights of the defence guaranteed by the constitution of the 
executing Member State, by casting doubt on the uniformity of the standard of protection of 
fundamental rights as defined in that framework decision, would undermine the principles of 
mutual trust and recognition which that decision purports to uphold and would, therefore, 
compromise the efficacy of that framework decision.263 A slightly alarming aspect of CJEU’s 
reasoning is that efficiency of the Framework Decision could even considered against 
fundamental rights, but this clearly shows the importance given to mutual trust. 
In legal literature, Dorociak - Lewandowski emphasized the role of mutual trust discussing the 
LM case, stating that only Member States, acting through the Council or the European Council, 
could suspend the mutual trust in relation to another Member State and declare the violation 
of one of the values of the EU.264 Dorociak - Lewandowski also saw that the potential 
suspension of mutual trust towards Poland would also mean suspension of mutual trust 
towards the whole EU in general. In practice, however, this would create an unnecessarily high 
threshold considering the need for judicial protection of individuals. 
It seems that CJEU’s case law aims to make a clear difference between Article 4 and other 
fundamental rights. In Article 4 cases, a finding, by the executing judicial authority, that there 
are substantial grounds for believing that, following the surrender to the issuing Member State 
of the person concerned by a EAW, that person will run a real risk of being subjected to such 
treatment, because of the conditions of detention prevailing in the prison in which it is actually 
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intended that he will be detained, cannot be weighed, for the purposes of deciding on that 
surrender, against considerations relating to the efficacy of judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters and to the principles of mutual trust and recognition.265  The fact that the prohibition 
of inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter is absolute, 
justifies, exceptionally, a limitation of the principles of mutual trust and recognition.266 
The decision of the executing judicial authority is without prejudice to the person in question’s 
opportunity, after surrender, to have recourse, within the legal system of the issuing Member 
State, to legal remedies granted. That person may, at that time, rely, inter alia, on respect for 
the rights to an effective remedy, to a fair trial and of the defence which is derived from 
Article 47 and Article 48(2) of the Charter.267 
The dividing factor then is the nature of the right: absolute or non-absolute. A risk to an 
absolute right allows non-execution more freely than Article 47 breaches. Whilst the 
prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment, laid down in Article 4 of the Charter, is 
absolute,268 the same is not true of the right to a fair trial set out in Article 47 thereof. That 
right may be subject to limitations.269  
However, CJEU’s case law’s emphasis of mutual trust in Article 47 cases, but not in Article 4 
cases, creates a problem. By underlining the right of an effective remedy and fair trial, CJEU is 
implying that these rights safeguard other fundamental rights, but they are not themselves 
worth the same scrutiny. Safeguarding Article 47 is not supposed to happen at the Member 
State making the surrender decision, but if right to a fair trial and rule of law are compromised 
at the requesting Member State, who provides the safeguard there? This relates the question 
back to Article 7 TEU and seems rather contradictory to CJEU’s own reasoning, because the 
CJEU has also emphasized that in the surrender procedure established by the Framework 
Decision the right to an effective remedy, set out in Article 13 of the ECHR and Article 47 of 
the Charter is of special importance.270 
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7.3. Building Trust 
7.3.1. Maintenance and Soft Law 
How to remedy the problematic issues described above? The answer to the question, when 
to suspend mutual trust in favour of Article 47, seems unclear at the moment. A solution must 
be found if rebuttable presumptions against execution of an EAW are acceptable in CJEU’s 
case law.  
According to Billing, the answer would ideally be achieved by inserting express provisions in 
the Framework Decision.271 This would promote certainty of law. Billing suggests that the 
Framework Decision should explicitly require national implementing legislation to establish 
the opportunity for substantial rebuttal evidence to be raised by the defence, or on the 
national executing judge’s own motion, if appropriate, against the execution of an EAW on 
human rights grounds, where there is a real risk that the requested person’s fundamental and 
international human rights will be violated due to systemic flaws, if the person requested is 
surrender to the issuing Member State.  
However, the Council and the Commission seem to believe that they can do maintenance 
through soft law by amending the EAW Handbook. Marin has said that this sounds like ‘a 
farewell to the rule of law’ and seems to exclude the European Parliament from the discussion 
of important legal and political questions, compromising the prerogatives attributed to it by 
the treaties.272  
Marguery has, unlike Billing, held soft law as a viable option in the absence of an amendment 
to the current legislation, stating that certain improvements concerning mutual trust between 
judicial authorities that are confronted with a fundamental right deficit may be enhanced 
through soft law.273 Regardless, at least national implementing the Framework Decision 
should clearly establish a rebuttable presumption, that the issuing Member State will 
guarantee the fundamental and human rights of those being surrendered, in compliance with 
the requirements of the Charter, the ECHR and general principles of EU law.274 
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Billing has highlighted Article 4(6) of the Framework Decision as a remedy in specific 
situations. Article 4(6) allows for the executing judge to refuse to execute the EAW on the 
basis that the executing Member State will “…undertake to execute the sentence or detention 
order in accordance with its domestic law”. This provision provides a reasonable alternative 
to surrendering a person to a state where the criminal justice system is a crisis.275  Billing drew 
attention to the fact that even this poses problems. In the case of a requested person who, is 
a suspect of a serious offence committed solely against the domestic law of the issuing 
Member State and who is able to present clear risk that their fundamental rights will be 
violated if surrendered, the options are limited: either, the EAW is executed in a manner that 
is not in compliance with the current Framework Decision or human rights obligations; or risk 
leaving open the possibility of forum shopping by non-resident criminals by refusing the EAW, 
at least until the situation in the issuing Member State has improved.276 
 
7.3.2. Strengthening Judicial Cooperation 
Recital 6 of the Framework Decision clearly states that the EAW was the first concrete measure 
implementing the principle of mutual recognition in the field of criminal law. The European 
Council referred to mutual recognition as “the cornerstone” of judicial cooperation according 
to the same recital. In 2009, the Framework Decision of 2002 was amended enhancing the 
procedural rights of persons and fostering the application of the principle of Mutual 
Recognition to decisions rendered in the absence of the person concerned at the trial.277 
Rather than creating an integrated single criminal justice system, enhancing cooperation 
remains the common rationale of legislative measures in the EU’s criminal justice field. 
Achieving progress in the cross-border reach of criminal justice (without subjecting national 
systems to the controversies and costs entailed in an extensive harmonization of national 
legislation and structures) has been successful through the strong emphasis on mutual 
recognition.278 
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Actual harmonization, however, has been kept to the absolute minimum necessary. To 
facilitate communication and interaction between the national systems without putting them 
under central control or forcing them to change their respective systems a range of measures 
have been adopted. Member States have transferred no actual executive judicial powers in 
the criminal justice field to the EU level which has ensured a continuing high degree of 
autonomy of national criminal justice systems.279 
In the area of criminal law and enforcement, Conway holds the view that it might be better, 
from a legal point of view, to discuss “cooperation” rather than the more loaded term of 
“integration”. “Cooperation”, though more modest in its ambition, will allow for incremental 
change in a way that will not undermine the legitimacy of reforms through sidelining national 
constitutional traditions.280 
Rather significant progress has been achieved since the adoption of the Resolution of the 
Council of 30 November 2009 on a Roadmap for strengthening procedural rights of suspected 
or accused persons in criminal proceedings (the Roadmap).281 Six directives have been 
adopted following the Roadmap: 
1. the Directive 2010/64/EU on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal 
proceedings,282 strengthening the right to interpretation and translation in surrender 
procedure; 
2. the Directive 2012/13/EU on the right to information in criminal proceedings283, which 
strengthened the right to information and introduced a Letter of Rights in EAW 
proceedings; 
3. Directive 2013/48 on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and in 
European arrest warrant proceedings, and on the right to have a third party informed 
upon deprivation of liberty and to communicate with third persons and with consular 
authorities while deprived of liberty;284 
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4. Directive (EU) 2016/343 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption 
of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings;285 
5. Directive (EU) 2016/800 on procedural safeguards for children who are suspects or 
accused persons in criminal proceedings;286 and 
6. Directive (EU) 2016/1919 on legal aid for suspects and accused persons in criminal 
proceedings and for requested persons in European arrest warrant proceedings.287 
These directives have without a doubt been important steps toward building a European area 
of justice, freedom and security. For example, a very positive aspect of the Directive 2013/48 
on the right of access to a lawyer is the possibility for the requested person in EAW 
proceedings to also appoint a lawyer in the issuing Member State. Though the lawyer’s role in 
the issuing Member State is limited unreasonably in the Directive’s text to simply “assisting” 
his colleague in the executing state while the competent authorities of the executing Member 
State are under no obligation to actively pursue such appointment of second counsel in the 
issuing jurisdiction, the official recognition of dual defence in the EAW proceedings is an 
important step towards effective protection of the individuals concerned. Furthermore, such 
dual defence facilitates the smooth functioning of the EAW mechanism and saves court time 
and costs.288 
Another procedural tool similar to the EAW was adopted when the European Investigation 
Order was adopted.289 Its purpose being that of facilitating and speeding up the obtaining and 
transfer of evidences between Member States, but also offering harmonized procedures for 
obtaining these.  
The 2009 amendment and the directives have contributed to strengthening the procedural 
rights of surrendered persons. Naturally they are small steps in the right direction and 
contribute towards strengthening mutual trust. However, they do nothing to fill the potential 
cracks between EAW, mutual trust, rule of law and fair trial on a larger level. If rule of law 
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backsliding continues, the situation is not amended by adding layers to an unstable 
foundation. Stronger incentives may be needed.290 
 
7.4. In the End, It’s Politics 
7.4.1. Inherently Political 
The path towards more cooperation in the field of European judicial cooperation since the 
EAW has not been all together unproblematic. Issues surrounding the EAW can, at least in 
part, be attributed to political unwillingness as exemplified by the fate of the European 
Commission’s Proposal for a Framework Decision on certain procedural rights in criminal 
proceedings, which did not reach unanimity.291 Anagnostopoulos has called it a “troubling” 
example of political unwillingness to promote and enhance individual rights in criminal 
proceedings under the guise of lacking legal basis and need for such an instrument.292 Sadly, 
this is an example of how political the system is inherently. 
Although one of the aims of the EAW system was to replace largely political extradition 
treaties with strictly judicial control, this evolution might have contributed to the political 
unwillingness described above. According to Marin, this shift of powers triggered by mutual 
recognition within national legal orders from legislative to the judicial authorities should be 
balanced by the possibility for political actors to control the process again.293 This would 
unlikely turn out to be a positive change. 
As Articles 2 and 7 of TEU have become integral to the current legal situation, as demonstrated 
by LM, it’s political nature must be underlined. ECJ has determined that it follows from the 
wording of Recital 10 of the Framework Decision  that it is for the European Council to 
determine a breach in the issuing Member State of the principles set out in Article 2 TEU, 
including the principle of the rule of law, with a view to application of the EAW mechanism 
being suspended in respect of that Member State.294 This gives up a large portion of power in 
the process back to political powers. 
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However, ECJ has also underlined the independence of judiciary as it guarantees the non-
involvement of political powers. The ECJ stated in LM that the requirement of independence 
means that the disciplinary regime governing those who have the task of adjudicating in a 
dispute must display the necessary guarantees in order to prevent any risk of its being used 
as a system of political control of the content of judicial decisions.295 
Although activation of Article 7 TEU can ultimately result in the suspension of membership 
rights, the aim of this political mechanisms is not to punish member states but rather to 
neutralize threats to the rule of law.296 Kochenov - Pech have held it highly unlikely that the 
Council would ever adopt sanctions under Article TEU 7. This is in part because, the Council is 
under no legal obligation to do so even in a situation where it concludes that a member state 
is in breach of Article 2 TEU values: this clearly shows the predominantly political nature of 
Article TEU 7.297  
Sadly, the EU’s Justice Programme budget has also not grown. As Fair Trials has noted, a 
limited budget and consistent pressure to create new instruments granting prosecutors ever 
more powerful tools, is limiting the ability of the Commission to enforce EU law in this area.298 
 
7.4.2. Developing Financial Incentives 
There have been attempts, on EU level, to link rule of law obligations to financial incentives. 
In 2018, the Commission put forward a proposal for a regulation on the protection of the 
Union's budget in the event of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in a Member 
State.299 The proposal addressed, from a budgetary perspective, generalised deficiencies as 
regards the rule of law: threats to the independence of the judiciary, arbitrary or unlawful 
decisions by public authorities, limited availability and effectiveness of legal remedies, failure 
to implement judgments, or limitations on the effective investigation, prosecution or 
sanctions for breaches of law. The Commission proposed the possibility for the Commission 
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to make proposals to the Council in such cases on sanctions measures with regard to EU 
funding: suspension of payments, suspension, reduction or even termination of legal 
commitments (to pay), suspension of programmes, and the transfer of money to other 
programmes. The European Parliament did not agree with the Commission’s initial proposal 
and made several proposals for amendments.300 
Finland’s current presidency of the Council of the European Union aims to find better and 
more efficient ways to ensure respect for the EU’s common values in the member states and 
to forestall potential problems and pursue the negotiations on making the receipt of EU 
funds conditional on respect for the rule of law.301 These aims recently brought Finland’s and 
Hungary’s political actors into an open disagreement as Hungary strictly opposes them. 
Hungarian government’s spokesman Zoltan Kovacs said in September 2019: “Trying to link 
rule-of-law conditions to the EU budget is pure political blackmail,” and that “If member states 
insist on it, then there simply won’t be an EU budget because Hungary will veto it.”302 In the 
beginning, there was mutual recognition, but in the end, politics.  
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8. Conclusions 
Principle of mutual recognition has become the cornerstone of judicial cooperation in both 
civil and criminal matters within the Union. The formal and political extradition procedure was 
abolished among the Member States and replaced with the simpler, surrender-based 
European Arrest Warrant adopted under the Framework Decision of 18 June 2002. 
“Surrender”, as a term, conveys the meaning of mutual recognition of a foreign-issued warrant 
as opposed to the centrally controlled and essentially more discretionary request for 
“extradition”. 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, by stating all fundamental rights 
in a clear and visible manner, contributes in part to the creation of a space of freedom, security 
and justice and improves legal safety regarding the protection of fundamental rights. 
Article 47 of the Charter (titled “Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial”) states the 
fundamental building blocks of a fair trial: fairness, a public hearing, reasonable time and a 
tribunal, previously established by law, that is both independent and impartial. 
Any limitation on the exercise of the right must be provided for by law and respect the essence 
of the right to a fair trial. Article 47 contains in each paragraph components of the essence: 
access to a court, judicial independence, legal representation, and legal aid among others. 
Several persistent issues concerning the EAW and right to a fair trial exist: issuing EAWs 
without taking proportionality into account, surrenders despite human rights concerns and 
persons sought under EAWs not being provided with legal representation. 
One of the values the EU is founded on is rule of law. The meaning of requirements of right to 
a fair trial and procedural legal protection is easy to explain with the current principle of rule 
of law. Activation of Article 7 TEU aims to neutralize threats to the rule of law in a situation 
where a serious and persistent breach exists. “Rule of law backsliding” has been described as 
the process through which elected public authorities deliberately implement governmental 
blueprints which aim to systematically weaken, annihilate or capture internal checks on power 
with the view of dismantling the liberal democratic state and entrenching the long-term rule 
of the dominant party. In recent years, this phenomenon has been observed especially in two 
Member States; Poland and Hungary. 
The principle of the effective judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law is a general 
principle of EU law, enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of ECHR and reaffirmed by Article 47 of the 
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Charter. Judicial protection can override all conflicting principles that aim to preserve non-
justiciable decision-making of the EU’s political institutions, the procedural autonomy of the 
Member States, or even their mutual trust. The Framework Decision does not have the effect 
of modifying the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles, 
but also does not expressly provide grounds for mandatory or even optional non-execution of  
a requested person if that surrender would infringe a person’s fundamental right to a fair trial.  
However, Member States have in their national legislation introduced grounds not provided 
for in the Framework Decision. For example, Finland’s Act on Extradition on the Basis of an 
Offence Between Finland and Other Member States of the European Union, implemented to 
adopt the Framework Decision, provides that the EAW shall be refused if there is justifiable 
cause to assume that the person requested would be subjected to a violation of the person’s 
human rights or constitutionally protected due process. 
CJEU in its case law rather stubbornly held on to the principle of mutual recognition and to 
the view that the Member States are in principle obliged to act upon a EAW and must or may 
refuse to execute a EAW only in the cases listed in the Framework Decision. This view was 
upheld in order to not cast doubt on the uniformity of the standard of protection of 
fundamental rights as defined in the Framework Decision. That doubt would undermine the 
principles of mutual trust and recognition and compromise the efficacy of the EAW as a whole. 
Aranyosi and Căldăraru marked a change in tone: the need to secure fundamental rights over 
mutual recognition was established. Moving further, the LM judgment established that even 
right to a fair trial (a derogable human right) can, under strict conditions, lead to a non-
execution of a EAW. 
As a first step, the executing judicial authority must assess, on the basis of material that is 
objective, reliable, specific and properly updated concerning the operation of the system of 
justice in the issuing Member State, whether there is a real risk, on account of systemic or 
generalised deficiencies there, of the fundamental right to a fair trial being breached. 
Then as a second step, if, having regard to the requirements noted, the executing judicial 
authority finds that there is, in the issuing Member State, a real risk of breach of the essence 
of the fundamental right to a fair trial, that authority must, as a second step, assess specifically 
and precisely whether, in the particular circumstances of the case, there are substantial 
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grounds for believing that, following his surrender to the issuing Member State, the requested 
person will run that risk. 
The CJEU has drawn inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States for the purposes of defining the fundamental rights. Each of the Member States is a 
signatory to the ECHR and is therefore bound to apply its rules. The ECtHR does not exclude 
that an issue might exceptionally be raised under Article 6 of the ECHR by an extradition 
decision in circumstances where the person has suffered or risks suffering a flagrant denial of 
a fair trial in the requesting country. The presumption of equivalent protection applies when 
the mutual recognition mechanisms require the court to presume that the observance of 
fundamental rights by another Member State has been sufficient. 
The principle of mutual trust requires, save in exceptional circumstances, to consider all the 
other Member States to be complying with EU law and particularly with the fundamental 
rights recognised by EU law. Not complying, the Member States face the risk of having their 
requests for cooperation systematically denied across the whole EU. Mutual trust must be 
earned and deserved. 
A risk to an absolute right allows non-execution more freely than Article 47 breaches. Whilst 
Article 4 of the Charter, is absolute, the same is not true of the right to a fair trial set out in 
Article 47 thereof. That right may be subject to limitations. The dividing factor then is the 
nature of the right: derogable or non-derogable. 
The currently unclear situation would ideally be achieved by inserting express provisions in 
the Framework Decision, which would promote certainty of law. However, at the moment, 
maintenance of the Framework Decision is realized only through soft law and supplemented 
by further cooperative measures. 
Many of the issues surrounding the EAW can be attributed to political unwillingness and the 
inherent political nature of the system. Thus far, attempts to link rule of law obligations to 
financial incentives have been unsuccessful. These aims have even brought political actors 
into an open disagreement. The objective to create a less formal extradition procedure 
without political factors has thus been hindered by political players. 
